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This is NKS 
NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research) is a scientific cooperation program in nu-
clear safety, radiation protection and emergency preparedness. It is a virtual or-
ganization, serving as an umbrella for joint Nordic initiatives and interests. Its pur-
pose is to carry out cost-effective Nordic projects producing seminars, exercises, 
reports, manuals, recommendations, and other types of reference material. This 
material, often in electronic form on the official homepage www.nks.org or CD-
ROMs, is to serve decision-makers and other concerned staff members at authori-
ties, research establishments and enterprises in the nuclear field. 
 
A total of six projects were carried out during the sixth four-year NKS program 
1998 - 2001, covering reactor safety, radioactive waste, emergency preparedness, 
and radioecology. This included an interdisciplinary study on nuclear threats in 
Nordic surroundings. Only projects of particular interest to end-users and financing 
organizations have been considered, and the results are intended to be practical, 
useful and directly applicable. The main financing organizations are: 
 
• The Danish Emergency Management Agency 
• The Finnish Ministry for Trade and Industry 
• The Icelandic Radiation Protection Institute 
• The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 
• The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and 
the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority 
 
Additional financial support has been received from the following organizations: 
In Finland: Fortum (formerly Imatran Voima, IVO); Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) 
In Sweden: Sydkraft AB; Vattenfall AB; Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Manage-
ment Co. (SKB); Nuclear Training and Safety Center (KSU) 
 
To this should be added contributions in kind by all the organizations listed above 
and a large number of other dedicated organizations. 
 
NKS expresses its sincere thanks to all financing and participating organizations, 
the project leaders, and all participants, all in all some 300 persons in five Nordic 
countries and the Baltic States, without which the NKS program and this report 
would not have been possible. 
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Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this document remain the responsibility of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect those of NKS.  
 
In particular, neither NKS nor any other organization or body supporting NKS 
activities can be held responsible for the material presented in this report. 
 
Abstract 
The aim of the NKS/SOS-1 project has been to enhance common understanding 
about requirements for nuclear safety by finding improved means of communicat-
ing on the subject in society. The project, which has been built around a number of 
seminars, was supported by limited research in three sub-projects: 
 
Risk assessment 
Safety analysis 
Strategies for safety management 
 
The report describes an industry in change due to societal factors. The concepts of 
risk and safety, safety management and systems for regulatory oversight are de-
scribed in the nuclear area and also, to widen the perspective, for other industrial 
areas. Transparency and public participation are described as key elements in good 
risk communication, and case studies are given. Environmental Impact Assessment 
and Strategic Environmental Assessment are described as important overall proces-
ses within which risk communication can take place.  
Safety culture, safety indicators and quality systems are important concepts in the 
nuclear safety area, but they also offer important challenges for the future. They 
have been subject to special attention in the project.  
Key words 
Nuclear safety, risk assessment, risk communication, safety culture, safety indica-
tors, quality systems, Environmental Impact Assessment, transparency 
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Summary 
The SOS-1 project has highlighted current developments within the nuclear energy 
area on a broad basis. It has taken the view that safety essentially should be under-
stood as awareness among those concerned in regard of the control of risk. This 
means that safety can not be said to be fully provided for until it has been commu-
nicated, implemented and well understood. There is thus a close connection be-
tween risk communication both within (and between) the experts groups, and be-
tween them and concerned citizens. 
The project has made an attempt to describe nuclear safety with a broad spectrum 
of perspectives. This has been done with a variety of methods, such as question-
naires, interviews, seminars, special research projects and focus group discussions. 
Mostly people actively working with nuclear safety (in industry, regulatory bodies, 
universities and consultant companies) were involved. Parts of the project have 
also approached lay people, but with some connection to nuclear safety. In a broad 
sense, the project has been devoted firstly to how one can organize for safety and 
secondly how risk communication can be improved.  
Three elements in the safety work  
Experience from high reliability organisations has brought many insights in how to 
organise for safety, but has also demonstrated various mechanisms, which may 
introduce hidden deficiencies in the safety activities. The challenge is to detect and 
correct such deficiencies before the risk is realised. Three key concepts for this, 
which have been subject to special attention in the project, is safety culture, safety 
indicators and quality systems.  
The concept of safety culture, that emerged after the Chernobyl accident, has a 
considerable impact on the nuclear safety work, even if it may be hard, or probably 
impossible, to define it so that it can be measured. The interpretation of the concept 
as the ability of an organisation to create safety by knowledge and involvement 
seems constructive and inspiring. A special aspect of the concept concerns the 
regulatory authorities, since for them it has a two-fold purpose. They have to re-
view the safety culture at the utilities at the same time, as they in their own work 
need commitment and responsibility to develop and maintain a safety culture ap-
propriate for a regulator. 
The safety culture must continuously be encouraged and stimulated by manage-
ment, especially since it can be exposed to negative pressure from both inside and 
outside factors. Many see the deregulation as a potential threat for the safety cul-
ture and others have mentioned the difficulty of attracting young professionals to 
the nuclear area.  
Even if the concept of safety culture can not be accurately defined, it is connected 
to the concept of safety indicators, which is used to reflect the safety of a nuclear 
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facility. The indicators should also be able to provide warnings that future per-
formance might be in danger. Furthermore, safety indicators should reflect a devel-
opment over time to make a judgement if present development is for the better or 
for the worse. There are many benefits with the use of indicators, but they need to 
be reviewed and changed regularly to better reflect the goals of the organisation. 
The concept of quality systems has also been subject to special interest in SOS-1.  
On a generic level it can be seen to contain documentation of an agreed quality 
together with a description of how that quality is reached. It seems clear that the 
quality systems have an important task of ensuring a systematic knowledge sharing 
and learning. 
How to improve risk communication 
It can well be said that the nuclear waste area is a forerunner in developing meth-
ods and frameworks for transparency and public participation, which have also 
been applied e.g. in the site selection process. The Environment Impact Assessment 
has been an “umbrella process” for this both in Sweden and Finland, within which 
many new and innovative initiatives have taken place.  It is believed that some of 
the methods developed could set examples not just within the nuclear sector, but 
also for other complex areas such as biotechnology. The report suggests some ele-
ments in a strategy for risk communication:  
• The overall attitude (among decision-makers, industry regulators etc) must 
become more communicative, with the point of departure that decisions on 
nuclear power, siting of repositories etc are grounded in public values 
• The nuclear waste issues (as well as the investigations for a fifth reactor in 
Finland) have shown that communication can be based on an all-covering 
process (“umbrella process”) such as EIA or Strategic Environmental As-
sessment (SEA) 
• Within the umbrella process there is room for testing many kinds of means 
such as different forms of hearings, consensus conferences etc  
• There is room for the regulatory bodies to play an active role in this com-
munication 
• One should not underestimate “the public”, which also possesses various 
areas of expertise. The experiences in Oskarshamn show that laypeople 
(non-professionals in nuclear safety such as politicians, civil servants, stu-
dents etc) can develop capacity for “stretching” and challenging the indus-
try implementer.  
• The concept of “stretching” has become very useful for understanding how 
transparency can be achieved. Enhancing the stretching capacity of lay 
 vi
people also in the nuclear reactor area would be good also for the utilities. 
In Sweden, this may be possible with the local safety councils.  
The safety analysis is at the core of risk assessment for decision-making both in 
reactor safety and for waste disposal. One key element in the improvement of risk 
communication is thus the development of more communicative ways for safety 
analysis and performance assessment. 
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Sammanfattning 
NKS/SOS-1 har sökt ta ett brett perspektiv på säkerhetsarbetet inom det 
kärntekniska området. Säkerhet uppfattas som medvetenhet hos alla berörda om de 
risker som kan finnas och det skydd som finns att lita på. Det betyder att säkerheten 
är uppfylld först när den har kommunicerats, implementerats och blivit förstådd. 
Det finns alltså en stark koppling mellan säkerhet och riskkommunikation, dels 
mellan olika expertgrupper men också mellan dessa å ena sidan och en bredare 
allmänhet å andra sidan.  
Projektet har använt ett brett spektrum av metoder som intervjuer och 
frågeformulär, seminarier, särskilda forskningsinsatser och fokusgruppdiskussioner 
för att nå sina målsättningar. Deltagare har i första hand varit sådana som arbetar 
inom kärntekniksektorn inom industri, myndigheter, forskningsinstitutioner och 
konsultfirmor. Delar av projektet har även involverat lekmän med någon 
anknytning till den det kärntekniska området.   
Tre aspekter på säkerhetsarbetet  
Organisationen har den mest centrala betydelsen för säkerheten. Det finns goda 
erfarenheter från kärnteknisk och annan industri, men det finns också exempel på 
hur svagheter i säkerhetsarbetet kan uppstå. Det gäller att uppmärksamma och 
åtgärda sådana defekter innan de ställer till skada. Tre nyckelbegrepp i detta 
sammanhang, som undersökts inom SOS-1, är säkerhetskultur, säkerhetsindikatorer 
och kvalitetssystem.  
Begreppet säkerhetskultur, som fick en framskjuten plats efter olyckan i 
Tjernobyl, har haft betydande inverkan på säkerhetsarbetet även om det kan vara 
svårt, för att inte säga omöjligt, att definiera begreppet så att det kan mätas. 
Begreppet kan närmast uppfattas som en organisations förmåga att skapa säkerhet 
genom kunskap och engagemang. För myndigheter tjänar begreppet ett dubbelt 
syfte: dels ska de granska industrins säkerhetskultur, dels måste deras eget arbete 
präglas av engagemang och ansvar. 
Säkerhetskulturen måste ständigt uppmuntras och stimuleras av ledningen eftersom 
den kan utsättas för negativ påverkan av både interna och externa faktorer. Många 
ser avregleringen som ett möjligt hot mot säkerhetskulturen och andra framhåller 
svårigheterna med att rekrytera kompetens till kärnkraftområdet inom den unga 
generationen.  
Säkerhetskulturen har en stark koppling till kvantitativa säkerhetsindikatorer som 
är instrument för att få mått på säkerheten.  Indikatorerna bör kunna ge 
varningssignaler om en anläggnings säkerhetsmässiga status kan komma att 
minska. Säkerhetsindikatorer bör även kunna ge indikationer på utvecklingstrender 
så att man kan bedöma om utvecklingen har positiv eller negativ karaktär.  
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Att använda säkerhetsindikatorer har många fördelar med det finns också problem i 
sammanhanget. En risk är att indikatorerna ges för stor betydelse som 
målsättningar.  Säkerhetsindikatorerna bör behållas som just indikatorer, vilket 
bland annat innebär att de bör kunnas bytas ut relativt ofta som anpassning till 
organisationens förändrade förutsättningar och målsättningar.  
Begreppet kvalitetssystem har också uppmärksammats särskilt i SOS-1. Det syftar 
till dokumentation på en bestämd kvalitetsnivå och en beskrivning av hur kvalitet 
ska uppnås och upprätthållas. Kvalitetssystem har också en viktig funktion för 
kunskapsspridning och lärande i en organisation.   
Riskkommunikation 
Om säkerhet ska uppfattas som medvetenhet om risker och hur de ska hållas under 
kontroll får riskkommunikation central betydelse. I de nordiska länderna har 
kärnavfallsområdet varit föregångare i att utveckla metoder för riskkommunikation 
genom transparens och medborgarinflytande, inte minst i platsvalet för slutförvar. 
MKB-processen (MiljöKonsekvensBeskrivning) har varit den övergripande 
processen för detta både i Finland och Sverige inom vilken många initiativ till nya 
arbetsformer har tagits. De nya arbetsmetoder som kommit fram bör kunna vara till 
nytta även inom andra samhällsområden, som t.ex. biotekniken. SOS-1 rapporten 
anger några inslag i en strategi för god riskkommunikation:  
• Attityden hos beslutsfattare, industri och myndigheter måste vara 
kommunikativ, och ta sin utgångspunkt i att beslut om kärnkraft och 
kärnavfall måste ha sin grund i samhälleliga värderingar. 
• Platsvalsprocesserna för slutförvar har, liksom frågan om en femte finsk 
reaktor, visat att dialogen med fördel kan grundas i en ”paraplyprocess” 
som t.ex. MKB.  
• Inom en sådan övergripande process finns det goda möjligheter att pröva 
olika metoder som t.ex. olika former för utfrågningar och 
konsensuskonferenser. 
• Myndigheterna bör spela en aktiv roll i dialogen. 
• Man får inte underskatta ”allmänheten” som också har expertkunskaper 
inom olika områden. Erfarenheter från framför allt Oskarshamn visar att 
lekmän (personer som inte har expertkunskaper om kärnsäkerhet som t.ex. 
politiker, tjänstemän, studerande etc.) kan utveckla betydande kapacitet för 
att ”stretcha” industrin och utmana med frågor från nya perspektiv.  
• Begreppet ”stretching” har visat sig mycket användbart för att öka 
transparensen i komplexa frågor. En utvecklad förmåga till detta hos 
lekmän även för reaktorsäkerhet skulle vara en tillgång även för 
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kraftbolagen. I Sverige skulle detta kunna åstadkommas hos de lokala 
säkerhetsnämnderna.  
Säkerhetsanalysen har en central roll som beslutsunderlag inom både reaktor- och 
avfallsområdena.  Riskkommunikationen måste alltså även omfatta 
säkerhetsanalysen, vilket kommer att ställa nya krav på dess experter.  
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1.  Introduction 
The aim of the NKS/SOS-1 project was to enhance, through enhanced 
communications and transparency, common understanding of nuclear risk and 
safety to enable wider appreciation of what is required for nuclear safety to be 
established and trusted. The project, which was built around a number of seminars
supported by limited research efforts had three s
, 
ub-projects: 
reas. 
1. Risk assessment  
2. Safety analysis  
3. Strategies for safety management 
 
Risk assessment is a necessary ingredient in identifying various risks and 
assessing their importance as compared with other risks. Research has however 
shown that risk assessment is built not only on objective considerations, but also on 
more value-laden and subjective approaches. That means that due considerations 
also has to be given to issues such as risk comparisons between different areas, 
values, risk perception, risk communication and transparency.  The point of 
departure is that risk assessment is not something just for the ”experts”, but ought 
to involve contributions from all concerned, including laymen.  
 
Thus, “to enhance the understanding about requirements for nuclear safety” does not simply 
mean that the industry experts must be better to inform the public. They must also increase 
their own understanding about what are the factors that govern layman’s risk assessment. 
Often the industry (and the authorities) has not listened carefully enough to different 
arguments and there might have been an underlying perception that those who express 
different opinions do not understand the facts.  
 
The work within SOS-1 has included a series of interviews, focus group 
discussions and questionnaires within the reactor safety and waste disposal a
Furthermore, a study on values in the performance assessment of nuclear waste 
repositories have been accomplished in cooperation with the European Union 
RISCOM –II project. 
Safety analysis is concerned with the question what can be considered safe 
enough. It is clear that any safety analysis has to rely on a risk assessment in which 
various threats are identified. To these threats there are various measures 
introduced to either remove the risk, make it far less probable or make the 
consequenses less severe. The SOS-1 work in the area of safety analysis has dealt 
with common issues within the entire nuclear field as concerns safety assessment, 
such as: 
 
• Description of “risk patterns” and regulations in reactor safety and nuclear 
waste disposal  
• Requirements for safety assessment for the entire nuclear field   
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• The role of safety analysis   
• Uncertainties: Their structure and how to treat them, expert judgement 
• Transparency, required to make the safety analysis accessible also for 
stakeholders and interested citizens. 
ics:  
d 
report.  
 
ety 
The work has essentially been done through conducting a seminar and a project 
about risk management in Europe outside the nuclear sector.  
Strategies for safety management is the basis for the activities by which the 
required safety is reached in practice on a continuing basis. The strategies for 
safety management include, but are not restricted to, quality systems, feedback of 
operational experience and indicators for the reached level of safety. Sometimes 
safety culture of the organisations involved is considered to be the basis for safety 
management. In SOS-1 key components in a strategy for safety management have 
been addressed in seminars supported by limited research activities. Seminars have 
been held on the following top
• Safety indicators. March 17-18, 1999. VTT in Espoo, Finland.  
• Safety culture. October 26-27,  1999. TVO, Olkiluoto, Finland  
• Quality assurance. January 16-17, 2001, Ringhals, Sweden  
 
A special subproject has been conducted to follow up the EU project 
"Organizational Factors; their definition and influence on nuclear safety, ORFA". 
In this subproject interviews were held with persons at utility management level. 
Even if the task was to prepare a new EU project, experiences and results were fe
into this SOS-1 
In this report we start by a short description of  “an industry in change” in chapter 
2. We then introduce the concepts of risk and safety in chapter 3. Chapter 4 deals 
with risk and safety management first in the nuclear sector, then in other industrial 
areas. Chapter 5 deals with risk communication and trust, as well as the related 
concept of transparency. In chapter 6 we describe processes for how risk 
assessment is used in decision making. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 summarize the meaning
and use of safety culture, safety indicators and quality systems in the nuclear saf
work. Chapter 10 discusses some challenges that the nuclear industry meets and, 
thereafter chapter 11 summarizes conclusions from the project. 
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2.  An industry in change 
The nuclear industry has been faced with a lack of societal support. At the same 
time media and the public have been increasingly attentive to problems at the 
nuclear power plants. This has created a situation where small incidents, as judged 
by the expertise, sometimes have been perceived as serious events by the public. 
thus needs to be communicated that there is from the outset common knowledge 
that equipment fail at times and that humans make errors and that this is accounted 
for in existing, well-established safety strategies. These strategies build on known 
safety principles, which are guiding the design, construction and operation of 
nuclear power plants. The NKS/SOS-1 project has addressed some of the strategie
and principles for ensuring a continuing safety of the nuclear power plants. In this 
section we give a background description of recent and current developments in the 
nuclear sector.  
It 
s 
t 
 
cesses. 
 
th 
er 
e industry. 
to.  
Decreased societal support 
The nuclear industry has gone through several changes since the nuclear power 
plants in Finland and Sweden were built and taken into operation. There have been 
changes in the society, in the ownership of the electric utilities, in the economic 
conditions for electricity generation, in regulatory requirements, in technical 
solutions, etc. Among the changes in the society there is not only the massive 
opposition against nuclear power that developed during the 70-ies and 80-ies bu
also changing values and expectations among young people starting their 
professional careers. The changes have initiated various processes of adaptation to 
a new situation by the nuclear utilities, which in turn has led to various changes in
organisation and work pro
A great deal of opposition towards nuclear power has been one of the 
characteristics of the environment in which the industry is operating today. It is 
easy to understand that the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl aroused a 
large public concern. The recent accident in Tokai-mura1 and the scandal 
connected to the falsification of data at BNFL2 are other examples of accidents and
incidents diminishing public trust and confidence in the industry as a whole. Wi
these events in mind, it is easy to understand that an accident in any nuclear pow
plant in the world is influencing the whol
In Sweden phasing out of the nuclear industry was started in 1999 with the shutting 
down of the Barsebäck 1 unit. The second unit is presently scheduled for shut 
down in 2003. This development is contrasted by the application for a decision in 
principle to build a fifth nuclear unit in Finland as filed in 2000 by TVO, the 
company operating the two nuclear reactors in Olkiluo
The low societal support can also be seen in a decreasing number of nuclear engi-
neering programmes at the universities. This development has apparently several 
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causes, but it has raised concerns for how the specific nuclear competence can be 
maintained. 
Deregulation in the electricity market 
A deregulation of the electricity market has been initiated in many countries over 
the world. The deregulation of the electricity market in the Nordic countries started 
in Norway in 1991. Finland and Sweden followed in 1995 and 1996 and now also 
Denmark has joined the deregulated market. In this process competition has been 
introduced in electricity production instead of former regional monopolies. Decrea-
sing electricity prices have been the most visible effect of the deregulation. The 
deregulation influences the nuclear industry in several ways as discussed in a re-
cent report by the OECD/NEA3.  
The deregulation has led to changes in the ownership of the electric utilities in a 
process of acquisitions and mergers. This has also resulted in a change of the socie-
tal responsibility of the utilities towards a responsibility restricted to that of a 
commercial company. In this development some actors on the market have moth-
balled excess production capacity in a hope to be more profitable. The problem in 
the Nordic grid is that there is a very large difference in available capacity depen-
ding on how much it rains during a year. Some experts even argue that present 
capacity is not enough for meeting the demands during a cold winter which follows 
a dry year. 
Decreasing commercial profitability has forced the nuclear power plants in Finland 
and Sweden to search for ways to reduce their costs while at the same time pursu-
ing demanding investment programs as required to ensure competitively in the 
future and meeting increasing regulatory requirements. 
A decreasing vendor base 
The de-facto moratorium of the nuclear power programmes has led to a decreasing 
vendor base. That has forced the nuclear utilities to put a larger emphasis on ensur-
ing that crucial services are available. Some recent projects at the nuclear power 
plants have had components of ensuring that crucial components of knowledge are 
maintained for the future. In Sweden there have been large projects aimed at recon-
stituting the design base for the present power plants. In Finland the modernisa-
tion's of the Olkiluoto and the Loviisa plants to some extent also contained these 
components. 
The development in electronics and computers brought digital instrumentation and 
control systems to the conventional industry already many years ago, but the nu-
clear industry has been lagging behind in this development. The main reason has 
been that very few nuclear power plants have been built world-wide since the mid 
eighties. Another reason has been the difficulty in licensing these systems. Simi-
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larly computer based control rooms have, in spite of their obvious benefits, not 
been used very extensively. 
Progress in nuclear waste management  
In comparison to other countries both Finland and Sweden have made remarkable 
progress in the management of nuclear waste. Both countries have operating facili-
ties for final disposal of low- and intermediate level waste and for interim storage 
of spent nuclear fuel. Furthermore, Finland now has one site selected for permanent 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel, with support from the municipality and its citizens. 
In Sweden, the SKB company has proposed three municipalities for site investiga-
tions with extensive drilling programs. The municipality decisions whether to ac-
cept these investigations or not are pending but the acceptance in the three munici-
palities seem high, although there exists outspoken opposition in at least one of the 
municipalities.  
In comparison to the situation in the 1980s this is a significant change not just for 
the waste disposal as such but also for the industry at large. There may be several 
reasons for the present situation. One is clearly that all these communities, except 
one in Sweden, are communities hosting nuclear reactors. Other reasons, though, 
are most certainly the societal processes stipulated by legislation (the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment concluded in Finland4), the active involvement by the 
regulatory authorities in these processes, and initiatives taken by the municipalities 
in order to get good participative involvement (e.g. the “Oskarshamn model in 
Sweden5).        
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3.  Concepts of risk and safety 
Risk assessment and risk management is an increasingly important matter in mod-
ern society. For example, a study6 has shown that about 30 % of all motions sub-
mitted in the Swedish Parliament concern risk management in a broad sense. It is 
thus relevant to analyse what could be the meaning of the concepts of risk and 
safety from political, individual and technical perspectives.   
Various perspectives on risk 
Clearly the concept of risk involves probability and consequence as basic elements. 
Provided they can be determined by experience, experiment or theoretical risk as-
sessment, this part of the risk assessment can be done in a technical/scientific man-
ner, and different alternatives can be compared by using a simple risk measure. 
However, from political decision making point of view, risk management is not 
just a matter of calculating consequence and probability. In fact the resources soci-
ety uses to reduce risk (per life saved) vary remarkably between different areas7, 
which demonstrates that other factors have a strong influence.  
Also, from the individual perspective, the seemingly objective risk concept has 
many underlying dimensions. Vlek8 has grouped them into eleven categories:  
1) potential degree of harm/fatality, 2) physical extent of damage (area affected),  
3) social extent of damage (number of people involved), 4) time distribution of 
damage (immediate and/or delayed effects), 5) probability of undesired conse-
quence, 6) controllability (by self or trusted expert) of consequences, 7) experience 
with, familiarity, imaginability of consequences, 8) voluntariness of exposure 
(freedom of choice), 9) clarity, importance of expected benefits, 10) social distribu-
tion of risks and benefits, and 11) harmful intentionality. 
Clearly how to weigh theses dimensions in risk management decisions is often a 
matter of cultural norms and values. The public must be granted the right to see 
what the factual elements are and what are the value-laden elements in a given 
decision situation.  
There are results from a number of questionnaire surveys of the opinions and per-
ceptions of various risks by groups of "experts" and groups representing the public. 
The risks in question are not just concerned with nuclear power and nuclear waste 
disposal but there are also surveys concerning a broader spectrum of risks, illustra-
ting the factors that influence a person’s perception of a certain risk. Apart from 
registering the differences in risk perception between experts and laymen one  sur-
vey9 has also examined each group’s perception of the other group's perception of 
risk. The general picture here was that the experts had a fairly correct perception of 
how laymen judge various risks, whereas the laymen are less successful in judging 
how the experts judge the same risks. Laymen tended to believe that experts saw 
larger risks than they actually did. This is considered an important result to note, 
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since it must be assumed that risk communication (and probably any other commu-
nication, as well) is enhanced if the different actors have a correct picture of how 
the other actors judge the risks in question.  
Preconditions for safety 
Safety is concerned with the absence of risk, but it can be argued that it also is con-
nected to a certainty that all reasonable actions have been taken to remove undue 
risks. This implies that safety requirements are not placed only on object, but also 
on the work processes required to produce these objects. Safety is also associated 
to a general precautionary principle according to which actions should always be 
taken with safety margins. 
The low probability high consequence events pose one difficulty in risk manage-
ment. Because the events occur very seldom they cannot be managed purely using 
experience feedback, but they have to be assessed and reacted on using predictive 
models. Preconditions for safety will then be established based on assumed scena-
rios which can be prevented or mitigated by technical or administrative systems. 
Safety is commonly viewed purely as a matter of technical and administrative 
safety provisions, complying as a minimum with current regulatory requirements. 
We have felt it to make remarkable sense to understand safety essentially as com-
forting awareness among those concerned with respect to the control of risk. Ta-
king this view, safety could not be said to be fully provided for until such a claim 
has at least been communicated and well understood.  
Awareness 
It can be argued that safety always builds on an awareness of, on the one hand, 
possible threats and, on the other hand, of actions by which these threats can be 
removed. This has been further elaborated in a paper produced within SOS-110 
which discusses the usefulness of this perspective on safety – e.g. nuclear safety - 
in regard of achieving a working communication on the matter between the experts 
and the laymen, including political decision makers, media and the public, as well 
as among the experts, representing different types of expertise. Safety is thus pro-
posed to be seen in having provided for “awareness of required conditions for 
remaining in control of risk”. There are two types of awareness:  
1. Awareness of the risks and what is required to ensure safety (functional assur-
ance); 
2. Awareness of what is required to assure that the imposed safety requirements 
will be permanently met in actual practice (quality assurance). 
 
Gaining awareness in these respects is certainly fundamental and the two sentences 
clearly represent basic safety objectives. They also represent a sound view to be 
emphasised in the safety work and referred to in communicating information on the 
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strategies used for the management of safety. One can see that awareness can be 
implemented as a governing principle in the context of safety culture, safety indica-
tors and how it could help in transparency and risk communication.  
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4.  Safety management and regulatory oversight 
Safety management on the hand of the utilities and regulatory oversight are the key 
pillars on which safety is built in the nuclear industry and also in other industries. 
The division of roles and responsibility is that the utilities have the undivided re-
sponsibility for safety, which also means that regulatory oversight should never 
take control of any of the utility activities nor take any responsibility for the safety 
of the installations. The regulatory body is instead assumed as the agent of the so-
ciety to set the limits of acceptability for the installations and to inspect that all 
requirements have been met. In this chapter we give an overview of safety mana-
gement and regulatory oversight within the nuclear sector including reactor safety 
and nuclear waste disposal. In order to widen perspectives, we also give an over-
view of European risk management in other sectors, including the Seveso Directive 
and certain national approaches.  
4.1  Safety management in the nuclear industry   
Aspects of safety management 
Today there is an increasing recognition that safe and reliable operation within the 
nuclear industry depends not only on technical excellence, but also on individuals 
and the organisation.11 In general these issues are encompassed with the concept of 
safety management.12 There have also been examples arising attention internatio-
nally where a completely logical development in the small has led to organisational 
deficiencies in the large.13 14 In hindsight one may argue that the root cause in these 
cases was a weakened understanding of the business risk resulting from a poor 
safety management. Also recent incidents give demonstrations of poor safety ma-
nagement at least in that respect that an understanding of fundamental safety issues 
have not reached the shop floor.  
Basic safety principles 
Nuclear power plant site selection, design, manufacturing, construction and de-
commissioning is governed by a number of basic safety principles.15 The perhaps 
most important basic safety principle is the application of a graded approach in all 
activities which is based on the importance a function, an activity or a system has 
for safety. This implies a very deep understanding of how the plant behaves in 
various conditions and how various work activities contribute to nuclear safety. 
One of the most important means to reach safety ends is the application of sound 
safety principles in the design and construction of nuclear power plants. The most 
important principle in this connection is that of providing defence in depth16 of the 
safety. The principle relies on multiple, self-contained means for protecting each 
one of the multiple barriers constituting the containment of the radioactive materi-
als. The defence-in-depth principle includes providing for means to mitigate as far 
as possible the consequences also of severe accidents.  
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Another important principle is the single failure criterion, which means that an 
assembly of equipment can meet its required purpose despite the occurrence of any 
single random failure in that assembly. Failures that are a direct consequence of the 
initiating failure are considered to be a part of the sequence of events covered by 
the single failure criterion. This criterion is also applied for human errors to require 
that a single human error should not trigger a sequence of events, which may be a 
threat for plant safety. 
Safety assessments 
Safety assessments are important parts of safety management activities. The safety 
assessment methodologies can be divided into two broad classes: deterministic and 
probabilistic methods. The deterministic methods basically make a series of as-
sumptions of certain accident conditions and then calculate how the plant systems 
will interact to ensure that no margins of acceptability will be exceeded. The prob-
abilistic methods are based on a causal model, typically derived from deterministic 
calculations, of how various errors and failures propagate through the plant with 
the aim of arriving at a probability estimate of certain defined undesired conditions 
to ensure that they are unlikely enough. 
The probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) have had an important function at all 
plants in Finland and Sweden in that respect that they have helped in identifying 
and correcting weaknesses in the original design of the plant. The PSA is a good 
tool for assessing the relative importance of various sequences of events at the 
same plant, thereby helping to optimise the design. However, PSA should be used 
with great caution for comparing different plants.17 In combination, deterministic 
and probabilistic methods provide an excellent ground for making judgements re-
garding if the safety of an installation is acceptable. 
At present stages of repository development in Finland and Sweden long-term 
safety assessments are used to provide the safety-related basis for the sequence of 
decisions leading up to the realisation and licensing of the necessary waste disposal 
capacity.  
As for the operational safety, both probabilistic and deterministic methods are used 
to evaluate the post-closure safety for nuclear waste repositories. The appropriate 
balance between the methods can be different in the various stages of repository 
development, and is highly dependent on the quality of the database available for 
the most sensitive parameters. 
Probabilistic methods are utilised for two main reasons: 
- The necessity to take account for unavoidable natural variability in input 
parameters e.g. spatial variability of hydraulic conductivity in rock 
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- The necessity to demonstrate how sensitive the repository safety is to un-
certainties, e.g. in the understanding of important processes, in the mathe-
matical models, and in the input data available. 
The Swedish criteria for acceptable post-closure safety contain a criterion of 
maximum risk. Although bounding risk evaluations can be made deterministically, 
probabilistic approaches are necessary for a full understanding of the risk-
spectrum.  
Feedback of operational experience 
The feedback of operational experience is a necessary means for continuous im-
provement of the operational safety of any nuclear installation. The most important 
part of the feedback of operational experience has been connected to the analysis of 
incidents and accidents. Whenever an incident occurs at any plant in the world, it 
should be rapidly analysed to reveal its root causes and, in addition, there are sys-
tems for the distribution of this information to other plants worldwide.  
The nuclear power plants have internal activities for analysing their own experi-
ence together with the reported experiences from other plants in the world. When 
an important report is obtained it is analysed with respect to plant construction and 
operational practices to find possible needs for improvements. 
There has also been a systematic exchange of operational experience in many pro-
grammes of the international organisations such as IAEA, OECD/NEA and 
WANO. At the nuclear power plants in Finland and Sweden it has been an outspo-
ken management policy at the utilities, and at the regulatory bodies, to support a 
participation in these programmes. Vendors and research organisations have also 
played an important role in a rapid transfer of good operational experience between 
nuclear power plants in the world. 
 
For repository post-closure safety the international exchange is often in the form of 
reviews asked for by the national organisations and done by internationally recog-
nized experts appointed by eg IAEA or OECD/NEA. 
 
Inspections and reviews 
At nuclear facilities there are well-established practices for inspections and re-
views. In principle one could say that all equipment and work activities will go 
through consecutive inspections and reviews to ensure that they fulfil their required 
quality. For example plant modifications are going through a long process from a 
suggestion, project plans, design, construction, installation and testing before it 
finally is taken into operation. All these intermediate steps are thoroughly inspected 
and reviewed in order to discover if there are possible safety issues that have not 
been properly accounted for. 
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The consecutive inspections and reviews should as one part include persons who 
are independent from the people who have been involved in the work. This requi-
rement has often been taken care of by organising a group of experts specialising in 
these reviews. This group will then review not only the plant modifications, but 
actually most of the activities which are safety relevant such as writing procedures, 
issuing reports, preparing safety assessments, etc.  
One type of review is connected to the quality systems, which require regular au-
dits of all work activities. These audits are typically carried out by a small team, 
which through observations and interviews create for themselves an image of how 
specific activities are carried out. This is then compared with the instructions for 
the activities. Observations and deviations are then brought to the attention of the 
management to be corrected for instance by training, issuing new instructions or 
changing the organisational structure. 
For repository post-closure safety the reviews are either focused on systems de-
scriptions and safety assessments for planned repositories and coupled to the vari-
ous stages in repository development and licensing, or to the recurring reporting of 
results and programmes for the supporting R&D. 
Self-assessments and peer reviews 
A continuous assessment of operational performance is also part of the safety man-
agement activities. This assessment is ongoing as a part of all activities, but to be 
efficient it has to be systematised. One part of the continuous self-assessment is 
taken care of in the line-organisation in the process of setting goals and following 
up their fulfilment. Other parts are taken care of in specialised meetings or group 
activities. One example of such meetings is the review meeting of the annual refu-
elling shut-down experience most nuclear power plant use.  
The performance appraisals used in annual discussion between superiors and sub-
ordinates are another form of continuous self-assessments within the organisation. 
These discussions are important for the managers in assessing the general organisa-
tional climate together with indicators of emerging problems. In addition many 
nuclear power plants use various surveys to collect a more general impression of 
the contentedness of the personnel. 
Organisations cannot rely completely on internal self-assessments, but should now 
and then collect also outside views on activities and performance. Peer reviews 
have become an established way for that purpose. Peer reviews are offered by the 
international organisations such as IAEA, OECD/NEA and WANO typically in a 
team of 10-15 experts during a two-week mission. Peer reviews can also be carried 
out on the initiative of the nuclear utility itself as reported by Vattenfall18 and Syd-
kraft.19 An important side-effect of the peer reviews is also that they have a func-
tion of sharing good operational practices between the nuclear power plants, becau-
se some of the participating experts often come from other nuclear power plants. 
 12
Examples of two recent Peer Reviews of post closure assessments are the reviews 
of the Swedish SR 97 and the Finnish Tila 99. 
4.2  Regulatory oversight 
Basic requirements  
The regulatory requirements are always anchored in the national legislation, be-
cause they imply the exercise of authority in the case a utility fails to live up to the 
requirements. Another anchoring point is international agreements such as the 
IAEA International Safety Convention, which regulate a number of issues, which 
have a direct influence on various safety activities.  
Regulatory oversight is the final part of fundamental safety management activities. 
Regulatory oversight can be divided into two parts of which one is concerned with 
the definition of safety requirements and the other with activities ensuring that they 
are followed. Regulatory requirements are anchored in national legislation to de-
fine the conditions by which nuclear installations can be constructed and operated 
and the process by which operational permits are granted.  
Regulatory oversight was earlier very much connected to inspection and review of 
the technical solutions presented for various purposes. Today it is instead an 
outspoken strategy by many regulators to move more towards inspection and re-
viewing of the work processes by which nuclear power plants themselves ensure 
that their safety management activities are covering and efficient. Similarly the 
concept of risk informed regulation has also been associated to an allocation of 
resources for regulatory activities, which is governed by their importance for safe-
ty. 
National approaches 
The NKS/RAK-1 report described some of the main features of the regulatory sys-
tems in Finland and Sweden20. In the report it is concluded that the similarities 
between the two countries are predominant. The main principle is the same: the 
utilities have the full responsibility for safety whereas the authorities have the mis-
sion to seek assurance that the utilities take this responsibility. However, there are 
also differences.  
According to the ”Swedish model”, SKI promotes its safety goals on the basis of 
the willingness, competence and ability for achieving them as naturally to be ex-
pected on part of the utilities, being ultimately responsible for the safety. The aims 
are similar in Finland, but the approaches differ in the degree to which full and 
detailed verification against prescribed rules is required.  
In Finland, the operating licenses are typically granted for 10 years. The required 
renewal of the licenses in Finland provides for thorough re-assessment of the over-
all safety of the nuclear plants, largely on the basis of a compilation of the inspec-
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tion and assessment work done during the previous license period. The license 
renewals thus serve as an important complement to the ongoing inspection and 
assessment activities.  
In Sweden the operating licences are usually not limited in time. The purpose 
served by the licence renewals in Finland is instead served by periodic safety re-
views, the ASAR programme. ASAR has been concerned, in particular, with man-
agement and quality issues, performance records, past and current safety issues and 
plans for future safety improvements. The efforts were in the early eighties for a 
large part devoted to developing the PSA methodology and undertaking the first 
plant specific PSA analyses.  
Although there are differences in the arrangement of regulatory oversight in 
Finland and Sweden, there are also indications of a narrowing down of these dif-
ferences. These first steps towards a harmonisation of regulatory oversight can 
most likely be attributed also to the dialogue created in the regulatory reviews.21 22 
Based on experience from Finland and Sweden it is beneficial to maintain an effi-
cient working dialogue on a high managerial level between the regulatory body and 
the nuclear installation. 
A changing regulatory frame 
The knowledge base obtained from an increasing number of operational years of 
the world fleet of nuclear power plants has been reflected in the regulation. The 
probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) and the preparation for severe accidents are 
just a few of the new requirements, which have been brought into the regulatory 
requirements.  
Due to experiences in operation, the regulatory bodies also have had a leading role 
in bringing in the MTO (man – technology – organisation) area into the safety 
work. These questions have mostly been connected to the control room design, 
operator training and procedures. They have also been connected to the understand-
ing and modelling of human actions in the control room. Lately safety culture has 
been brought in as a concept encompassing many of the so-called "soft" issues 
connected to safety, such as organizational aspects.  
Finally the deregulation has brought a new regulatory concern, which is connected 
with problems in maintaining competence during major organisational changes. 
Such changes occur during mergers where rationalisation benefits are sought, but 
they also occur in a process of outsourcing and downsizing. Some regulators actu-
ally today require rather comprehensive safety cases when major organisational 
changes are planned. In a discussion with members of the senior management 
group at the nuclear power plants in Finland and Sweden, there were fears ex-
pressed that differences in the safety requirements may introduce undue restrictions 
in the competition.23 
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Regulatory bodies are often using independent reviewers to support their own deci-
sion making. Today these reviews are often carried out by international teams to 
ensure a broadest possible expertise. This practice may in due time bring in a better 
understanding of differences in national legislation and regulation. 
Nuclear waste disposal  
The area of nuclear waste disposal provides some extra challenges with regard to 
regulations and criteria, for example the long time scales involved in the safety 
assessment and the fact that there will be limited feedback from operational experi-
ence. However, for low- and intermediate level waste there are good experiences 
from the licensing of final repositories in Forsmark, Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Stan-
dards and criteria for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste have 
been subject for intensive international and Nordic cooperation during at least 
twenty years. Both Finland and Sweden now have regulations in place, although 
work still remains for guidance on how they should be applied.  
There has been a trend from dose criteria to more general risk related criteria. Ex-
amples of issues where the practical application of regulatory criteria needs further 
consideration are their use with respect to very long time scales, setting probabili-
ties to specific scenarios, and the issue of how human intrusion should be dealt 
with. Another trend is that regulations now tend to include more of other aspects 
than the protection of humans, i.e. the protection of nature in a broader sense. For 
years to come, the regulatory bodies will meet programs that advance from a ge-
neric level to site selection and licensing of real installations. In Finland, a site for 
final disposal has already been selected and approved, and in Sweden there are 
three candidate areas for siting.   
4.3  Other industrial areas 
This section intends to give an impression of the handling of safety of other types 
of industrial installations than those in the nuclear industry, especially the chemical 
industry. Focus will be on the situation in the European Union with respect to 
chemical industry. The description given here is based on an overview report24 
written for the SOS-1 project. 
Historical development  
From the 1960’s the increasing scale of operations and the introduction of new 
technology called for a more analytical approach than previously used for the as-
sessment of risks from chemical facilities. Methods such as HAZOP (HAZard and 
OPerability analysis), which can be applied before a facility is put into operation, 
were developed by industry. This technique is now an “industry standard”. Leading 
companies use HAZOP as part of a series of safety reviews during the design proc-
ess. Safety reviews are also carried out periodically on existing facilities handling 
hazardous materials. From the middle to late 1970’s the same detailed attention has 
been paid to protection of the environment. 
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In parallel with the identification of hazards came the requirement to predict their 
consequences. Early models used simple correlations; for example, an early corre-
lation for predicting the effects of explosions related all explosions to an equivalent 
quantity of TNT. Considerable work has been devoted to this aspect of risk as-
sessment through theoretical work, large-scale experiments and the development of 
computer codes. Models are now available for the most important physical effects. 
A number of major accidents in chemical factories, such as the Flixborough acci-
dent in 197425and the Seveso accident in 197626 gave rise to new legislation in 
many countries and were part of the background for the European Community's 
formulation of the directive known as the Seveso directive. A revised version of 
this directive, the "Seveso II directive", was adopted in 1996. 
Safety- and risk-related matters within the EU are subject to consideration at three 
levels: (1) EC directives, (2) European/international standardisation, and (3) na-
tional legislation. 
EC directives define the “essential requirements”, e.g. protection of health and 
safety, that must be fulfilled when goods are placed on the market or some industry 
is put into operation. The directives are implemented in the individual member 
states by national laws and directives. 
Standardisation, as well as the regulation of technical risks, is increasingly being 
undertaken at the European or the international level. The European standards bod-
ies (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) have the task of drawing up the corresponding 
technical specifications meeting the essential requirements of the directives. Such 
specifications are referred to as “harmonised standards”. Compliance with harmo-
nised standards remains voluntary, and manufacturers are free to choose any other 
technical solution that provides compliance with the essential requirements. This 
view is referred to as the “New Approach” to technical harmonisation and stan-
dardisation. 
The Seveso Directive 
The aim of the Seveso II Directive is two-fold. Firstly, the Directive aims at the 
prevention of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances. Secondly, as 
accidents do continue to occur, the Directive aims at the limitation of the conse-
quences of such accidents to man and the environment, in order to ensure high 
levels of protection throughout the EU in a consistent and effective way. Industrial 
operators that use large amounts of dangerous substances must demonstrate that 
they have assessed the risks and are managing them. However, no corresponding 
procedures are contained in the Directive; these are to be specified on a national 
level. As a result of differences of cultures and traditions in the member states, a 
variety of such procedures are currently in use. 
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The scope of the Seveso II Directive is solely related to the presence of dangerous 
substances in establishments. It covers both, industrial activities as well as the 
storage of dangerous chemicals. The Directive can be viewed as inherently 
providing for three levels of proportionate controls in practice, where larger 
quantities mean more controls. A company holding a quantity of dangerous 
substance less than the lower threshold levels given in the Directive is not covered 
by this legislation, but will be proportionately controlled by general provisions on 
health, safety and the environment provided by other legislation, which is not 
specific to major-accident hazards. Companies, who hold a larger quantity of 
dangerous substance, above the lower threshold specified in the Directive, will be 
covered by the lower tier requirements. Companies with even larger quantities of 
dangerous substance (upper tier establishments), above the upper threshold given 
in the Directive, will be covered by all the requirements contained within the 
Directive. Threshold quantities are specified for a number of individual substances 
as well as for classes of substances, e.g. carcinogens. 
 
Important areas excluded from the scope of the Seveso II Directive include the 
nuclear industry, the transport of dangerous substances and intermediate, 
temporary storage outside establishments, the transport of dangerous substances by 
pipelines and the mining- and oil production industries. 
 
Operators of "upper tier establishments" are required to produce a Safety Report 
within a fixed time frame, demonstrating that: 
A major accident prevention policy and a safety management system for 
implementing it are in effect. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Major accident hazards have been identified and necessary measures have been 
taken to prevent such accidents and limit their consequences for man and the 
environment. 
Adequate safety and reliability have been incorporated into design, 
construction, operation and maintenance linked to major accident hazards. 
Internal emergency plans have been drawn up and information has been 
supplied enabling an external emergency plan to be drawn up (the external 
emergency plan is the responsibility of the authorities). 
 
Less extensive requirements are placed on operators of "lower tier establishments". 
For instance, they do not need to produce a safety report, but they are required to 
draw up a document describing their major accident prevention policy and to 
ensure that it is properly implemented. 
 
Contrary to the first Seveso directive, Seveso II explicitly sets out requirements for 
making the safety report and other information available to the public (possibly 
excluding commercially or personally confidential parts). Furthermore, the 
directive prescribes that member states shall ensure that the public is able to give 
its opinion in cases of planning for new establishments, modifications to existing 
establishments, and developments around existing establishments subject to the di- 
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rective's articles 9 or 10. These requirements for information to and involvement of 
the public in the licensing process to a large extent cover the requirements set out 
in the 1998 UN-ECE Convention on Access To Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus 
convention).27 
In addition to the information of the public, mentioned above, the directive requires 
member states to supply to the Commission information about major accidents, 
which have occurred, and other experience acquired with respect to prevention of 
accidents and limitation of their consequences. The Commission on its side under-
takes to maintain a database containing this information. 
National approaches 
For substances identified as potentially damaging, a range of regulatory controls 
exists at both national and international levels. The approaches adopted in setting 
such controls vary across countries and regulatory agencies. In some countries, 
regulation is based on a precautionary stance, which requires that risks be mini-
mised where the causes and mechanisms are unknown, or human health or the en-
vironment health is under threat. In the extreme, such an approach implies that 
many hazardous chemicals and activities are considered unacceptable because of 
the uncertain nature of associated risks. This type of approach to the management 
of chemical risks may neglect the benefits that the chemicals could confer on soci-
ety. Less extreme interpretations of the precautionary principle stress the cost of 
taking precautionary measures, while others come closer to a “safe minimum stan-
dards” approach. 
Other approaches to risk reduction are technology-led: for example, where they are 
based on the concepts of making emissions ”as low as reasonably practicable” or 
the use of ”best available techniques not entailing excessive costs”. Both these 
concepts recognise, at least implicitly, that a balance should be struck between the 
costs involved in reducing risks and the benefits gained from risk reductions. 
The extent to which the Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) of different industries 
has gained acceptance in addressing major accident hazards varies from country to 
country. Within Europe some regulators were very enthusiastic requiring QRA 
studies by law, e.g. the UK and the Netherlands. Other countries, e.g. France, pre-
ferred to adopt more of a consequence based approach, while others, e.g. Germany, 
focused on adherence to codes, standards and good practice28. 
At a national level, in the Netherlands, probabilistic risk analysis is a requirement 
of the safety report. The Netherlands has a clearly defined policy on the maximum 
levels of risk that are acceptable when considering land-use decisions. In the UK, 
the probabilistic approach to risk analysis is favoured, but up until now, quantita-
tive risk criteria have been published only as far as the control of land-use in the 
vicinity of industrial facilities is concerned, whereas criteria for siting of new ac-
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tivities are being developed. In Germany, deterministic approaches are extensively 
used in the chemical process industry to demonstrate the quality of measures taken 
to avoid risk inside and outside the installation. The hazard potential is primarily 
determined by the impact range of material and energy emissions on the basis of 
exceptional incidents and nomogram techniques. 
A summary of some current individual risk criteria is presented in the table below. 
It is important to stress that these criteria are, in effect, actual or implied govern-
ment guidelines, which are applied with varying degrees of rigour. Furthermore, 
the criteria are applied to ”members of the public” rather than to ”workers”. This 
distinction is sometimes made with reference to ”involuntary” and ”voluntary” 
risks. Broadly speaking, the limits for workers, who ”voluntarily” expose them-
selves to risks, are a factor of ten - or more - higher. 
 
Country Nature of risk Limit of un-
acceptability 
Limit of ac-
ceptability 
Criteria ap-
plied in be-
tween 
Nether-
lands 
Fatality risk to 
residents close to 
hazardous facili-
ties 
1 in 1 million None, but 
until recently: 
1 in 100 mil-
lion 
ALARA* 
Nether-
lands 
Cancer risks Not given 1 in 100 mil-
lion 
N/A 
UK Fatality risk to 
residents close to 
hazardous facili-
ties 
1 in 100,000 0.3 in a mil-
lion 
ALARP** 
*As low as reasonably achievable 
**As low as reasonably practical 
 
Table 1: Examples of Actual and Implied Risk Criteria (per year of becoming a 
fatality or contracting a fatal risk) 
It can be seen that the criteria levels of acceptable/unacceptable risk vary by type of 
risk and by country. There is broad agreement that risks above 1 chance in 100,000 
per year (1 in 10,000 for workers) are ”unacceptable”. Risk levels of less than 1 
chance in 100 million per year are ”acceptable”, although a risk of 1 chance in 1 
million per year is ”acceptable” in many places. Generally, the level of ”unaccept-
able” risk corresponds to about 10% of the risk level associated with normal ”vol-
untary” risks (driving, working, etc.) and is similar to the higher ”involuntary” 
risks (being murdered, hit by a car, etc.). 
In summary, for existing technologies and ”known” risks, legislation or current 
best practice usually ensure that measures are considered for mitigating those risks 
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that are likely to be regarded as ”unacceptable”. Similarly, the presence of trivial 
risks is accepted as a matter of course. The concern is, therefore, over what ap-
proaches are to be used in mitigating the non-trivial risks, which fall into the 'grey' 
area where a balance needs to be reached between risks, costs and benefits, and 
other wider decision criteria. 
The reason that countries have different approaches to risk analysis methods and 
acceptance criteria probably should be sought in national traditions for how to han-
dle safety matters and national accident experience. An important element is the 
fact that chemical industry has developed over many years from small enterprises 
with only limited potential for harming people in the surroundings to very large 
factories and industrial areas with a substantial hazard potential. Thus the basis for 
the regulation has been laid by the rules for e.g. pressurised components at a time 
where no international collaboration on the area existed. It, therefore, is easy to 
understand that regulation has grown in different ways in different countries, and 
that the present very large regulatory systems are not easy to harmonise. 
Contrary to the chemical industry, the regulation of the "young" nuclear industry 
has developed in a much more uniform way - at the least in the "western world". 
From the very beginning the potential risk from nuclear power plants was recog-
nised and risk analyses were undertaken. Furthermore, there has always been ex-
tensive international exchange of ideas within the field, and international organisa-
tions such as the IAEA have supported common approaches to safety. 
 
 20
5.  Risk communication and trust 
The communication of hazards and risks to stakeholders and the general public has 
got an increased societal emphasis. The need for a proper communication can be 
seen from two different perspectives, firstly people have a right to know what kind 
of threats they might be exposed to and secondly proper actions in the case of an 
accident requires a certain participation of those who live near to the risky facility. 
Proper communication is also required when new potentially hazardous facilities 
are sited. Several studies have shown that efficient communication can be en-
hanced in an atmosphere of trust and confidence. 
5.1  Basics for risk communication 
The establishment of large industrial facilities did not meet much opposition during 
the first half of the 20th century. Industry was equal to a prosperous future with 
opportunities for the population. When environmental concerns became acute in 
the sixties and seventies decision-makers (industry, government and local authori-
ties) continued to do ”business as usual”. Decisions where made centrally, then 
announced and when ”surprising” opposition arose the decision was defended - this 
is often referred to as the DAD phenomena (Decide, Announce and Defend). This 
lack of understanding of the new environment resulted in distrust towards industry 
and numerous project collapses in the western world. 
In parallel with this development the analytic expert community grew in size and 
skill. The science community produced better understanding of health effects and 
exposure pathways.  The engineering community designed safer systems.  How-
ever, the decision-makers and their advisors lagged behind regarding going beyond 
traditional analysis in making risk-based decisions.   
Social science research described this problem early but it took quite some time 
before it was taken seriously by legislators and industry. Initially information was 
seen as the solution. By massive information everybody should be convinced. Also 
this strategy failed because it was still ”we and them” and no sharing of values or 
participation by the concerned people in the decision making process. The deci-
sion-makers have now understood the flaws in this approach as was expresses by 
the Swedish Minister of the Environment in 199929: 
“Still an obstacle in this process is the differences in values between 
the experts and the public. Values, consciously or unconsciously, are 
always involved how we relate and judge the world around us. This 
will of course influence the decision-making process, even when we 
think we stick to facts. We are always choosing, consciously or un-
consciously, which facts we want to present, the way we present 
them, what weight we give them or how we relate them to each 
other.” 
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All communication basically includes the following general concepts: the intent of 
sending of a message, the coding procedure used by the transmitter of the message, 
the information channels, the decoding procedure the receiver is using and the 
interpretation of the message by the receiver. For a message to be transferred cor-
rectly this implies among other things that the coding and decoding procedures do 
not corrupt the message, that the information channel can convey the coded infor-
mation and that the intent of the transmitter of the message is not conceived as 
improper by the receiver. These concepts are relevant for risk communication on 
the basis of the following arguments: 
– the initiator of the communication should not be perceived as manipulative 
with own hidden motives, 
– the parties communicating should be able to code the message in a common 
frame of reference using the same language,  
– the receiver of the message should be able to respond with own messages of 
concern, 
– the communication should result in mutual understanding of frames of refer-
ence, issues of concern, actions to be taken, etc. 
Risk communication is now developing into a science of its own. In 1997, Under-
standing Risk30 gave very little space to traditional analysis, but concentrated on 
working with what the book calls interested and affected parties to decide what 
should be examined, how it should be examined, and how any decision should be 
made.  This report stressed the need to bring in value issues from the beginning of 
any process and to iterate throughout the decision-making process, what the report 
calls an analytic-deliberative process.  
5.2  Case studies in reactor safety and nuclear waste      
The NKS/SOS-1 project has made attempts to get indications on the status of risk 
communication in the Nordic nuclear community, both in the reactor safety area 
and in nuclear waste disposal, which are described in this section.  
Reactor safety – the case of Oskarshamn 
This project31 was initiated in consideration of a specific event in 1998 where re-
sults from a probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) related to a Swedish nuclear power 
plant (O2) was unfavorably compared to PSA results at the Ignalina nuclear power 
plant and published in the media. The headlines and articles caused concern at the 
national level, and especially in the local community of Oskarshamn where the 
nuclear power plant in question is situated. Politicians of the local government, and 
specifically the members of the local safety council, were suddenly and rather 
forcefully faced with complex technical questions involving PSA results and risk 
comparisons, as well as questions about their work regarding the reliability and 
safety of the local nuclear power plant. 
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Focus groups and questionnaires were used to explicitly pinpoint the problems 
encountered when informing about or discussing risk and technologically advanced 
information (e.g. PSA-results) relative to the public and across professional groups 
with different types of expertise. Personnel at the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant 
and politicians in the local safety board provided their views of essential communi-
cation problems related to their work tasks in focus group discussions. Central 
topics that emerged from these discussions were later used in a questionnaire study, 
distributed to similar groups of power plant personnel, and politicians and adminis-
trators, in the local community. 
The overall conclusion of the study32 is that it seems feasible to continue the search 
for reliable constructs for a better understanding of various interacting parts of the 
communication process.  
The project paid attention to communication problems within the nuclear company 
and within the local safety board, between these two bodies, and between them and 
the “public”. As these communication problems are not normally dealt with in the 
“day to day” work, the focus group discussions were instrumental in the elicitation 
of experiences.  
Among the suggested initiatives that could improve communication about nuclear 
safety issues, the need for descriptions of nuclear technology activities provided in 
easily understandable language was rated highly in the focus groups, together with 
the need to develop measures which would increase the trustworthiness of risk 
information, and the education of various kinds of technical experts to become 
good information providers. The group of politicians emphasized more than others 
the need to clarify the responsibilities of various actors regarding providing media 
and the general public with information. 
As a result of this activity the local safety board decided to change certain modes 
of work and also to take more initiatives of their own in setting issues on the 
agenda. This later decision is especially interesting since if it is carried through in 
real terms, it will give the board a more active role in stretching (see section 5.3.) 
the power company. 
Hidden values in nuclear waste disposal  
There are hidden values in the assessment of various solutions for nuclear waste 
management, and also in the radiation protection standards. For example, the appli-
cation of individual dose and collective dose concerns dilution, which is a value-
laden issue. There are also other examples, such as:  
• Can dose optimisation be used for evaluating different nuclear waste manage-
ment systems, such as reprocessing (possibly as part of a transmutation sys-
tem), versus direct disposal?  
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• How should human intrusion be dealt with? 
• How should very long time scales be dealt with?  
The choice of an overall approach to the long-term management of high level nu-
clear waste must rely on a number of value based considerations. The very question 
whether to act in our lifetime for a final solution, typically including a deep reposi-
tory, or to wait for a possible technical and economical breakthrough for new tech-
nologies, such us transmutation, that eventually could decrease the amount of ra-
dioactivity is maybe the most obvious value laden issue. Closely linked to this are 
considerations about how closed and “final“ a repository should be. If the principle 
of retreivability leads to a “final” repository that may be left open for an undefined 
period of time, one values flexibility more than final solutions to the extent that the 
consequences for future generations can not be foreseen.  
 
Some environmental groups prefer the “wait and see” strategy before looking for 
disposal sites. Others, however, would like to see even more “final “ solutions 
(such as disposal in very deep boreholes) than the traditional methods (such as the 
Swedish KSB-3 method). In the technical community, on the other hand, value-
laden arguments are mostly avoided, and the arguments and discussions go on in 
purely technical terms. This is one of the most important reasons why transparency 
should be enhanced. 
 
In Sweden and Finland work on risk analysis has been done by interviews with 
safety analysis experts in the spring of 2001, as a joint effort between SOS-1 and 
the RISCOM-II project33. Briefly the aim of this work was to investigate assump-
tions of a value-laden nature that safety analysis experts have and use in their 
analyses, how the importance of this is recognized by the experts themselves and if 
information about this is provided in a transparent way.  
Experts from Finland and Sweden participated in interviews and in group discus-
sions. There were in all five persons from the Radiation and Safety Authority in 
Finland (STUK), the implementer Posiva Oy, and the Technical Research Centre 
of Finland (VTT). The Swedish interviewees were in total ten persons; six from the 
authorities (SKI and SSI) and four persons from SKB.  
The results from this study uses a model of the entire context within which the 
communication about safety analysis takes place. The model includes the specified 
“expert tasks” within “science policy” which in a larger societal context is included 
in “framework politics”. A general conclusion is that there is a need, and maybe a 
current tendency, to go from the tasks area to the science policy area to be able to 
clarify points of departure and assumptions for the safety analysis and related ac-
tions in waste management. With respect to information and communication vis-à-
vis the public, however, it is not the “experts tasks” that are in focus but the larger 
context of framework politics.  
 24
The results emphasize that the underlying assumption of system understanding 
makes possible using ”conservatism” and “all relevant interactions can be fore-
seen” as arguments for safety and reliability. Furthermore the use of safety analysis 
as a tool in societal decision making relies on the basic assumption that the relevant 
questions are asked and put forward in the work.  
5.3  Transparency and public participation 
The RISCOM Pilot Study34, funded by SKI and SSI has given a framework for 
transparency that builds on three blocks: facts, values and authenticity. Facts can 
be clarified with scientific methods and relate to questions like “Is it true?” or “Are 
we doing things right?” Value-laden issues relate to questions like “Are we doing 
the right things?” and reflect what is considered fair and acceptable in society – 
what is legitimate. Authenticity is what builds trust – it has to do with the consis-
tency between the actions of a person (or organisation) and who the person (or 
organisation) is, and the role in the decision making context.  
To achieve transparency there must be appropriate procedures in which decision 
makers and the public can validate claims of truth, legitimacy and authenticity. 
Another element in the transparency model is the concept of “stretching”, which 
means that the environment of the implementer (of e.g. a nuclear waste manage-
ment programme) is sufficiently demanding and that critical questions are raised 
from different perspectives.  
Transparency is strongly linked with public participation. In fact, if you accept the 
RISCOM model this has to follow.  It is needed for clarification of facts and val-
ues, as well as for testing stakeholders authenticity and stretching of arguments.  
Laymen posses important knowledge that is often neglected in decision making 
whereas citizens values should be reflected in the decisions. And authenticity is for 
the public to evaluate. Finally stretching can not take place without normal citizens 
because they often give new angles in testing arguments.  
Transparency needs public involvement – and meaningful public involvement can 
not take place without transparency in procedures. Thus if we want decisions with 
the best possible political and societal awareness, it follows that we also want citi-
zens participation. This is at the core of good risk communication.  
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6.  Risk assessment for decision making 
In the society there has been an increasing recognition that issues connected to 
risks have to be considered in a process of deciding on new possibly hazardous 
facilities. Due to the difficulties described earlier in this report there may be a large 
variety of different views on how the risk analysis should be carried out and inter-
preted in the decision making process. This interest in the consequences of certain 
large scale decisions is also in line with problems observed with unintended conse-
quences of technology based solutions. 
6.1  Current developments 
Ideally, as most of us see how democracy should work, the politicians take their 
decisions based on the societal values they are elected to represent. Politicians con-
sult scientists in accordance with practical needs, and the experts provide the fac-
tual material to the decision-makers. However, the expert role is not always so 
clean as one would expect. Experts may allow their own values to filter into their 
assessments, or rather, the underlying assumptions in the assessments. Experts may 
also have their own interest in the assessment results. Therefore, in a transparent 
decision- making system, the public must have a possibility to evaluate the argu-
ments of the experts, and if the experts are credible. 
The need for more influence by citizens and for better understanding about public 
attitudes in controversial issues, has caused a number of participative processes to 
emerge. Their aim is usually to capture values through the creation of small public 
spaces where issues are discussed. Consensus Conferences, Science Shops, Lay 
Peoples Panel, Team Syntegrity and the Oskarshamn model are only a few of a 
large number of participative and deliberative processes. On a larger scale there are 
broad frameworks for public participation. Two the most important ones are related 
to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assess-
ment (SEA). 
6.2  Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)  
According to most environmental legislation, every large construction project 
must be assessed in relation to its environmental impact, the societal need of 
the project, and the alternatives (including a ”zero-alternative”, i.e. doing noth-
ing). This Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is often judged as an im-
portant tool for the general public and different organisations to enter the deci-
sion-making process and influence the decisions. EIA is not only a document, 
where different environmental impacts are listed, but also a public decision-
making process, where technical knowledge as well as social and political fac-
tors are negotiated and given legitimacy in the wider society.35 The EIA should 
give a comprehensive overview of the impacts on the environment and human 
health and on the conservation of natural resources of a planned facility, activ-
ity or measure. It is usually the applicant who is responsible for the EIA. 
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Legislation requires that an EIA process has to evaluate the environmental con-
sequences of a planned project at an early stage, and definitely before it is real-
ised. Furthermore, it is required that alternatives, including the zero-alternative, 
are investigated in order to make as relevant comparisons as possible. How-
ever, the way in which an EIA process is carried out depends to a high degree 
on the applicant, for example if citizens are allowed to influence the process or 
not. Therefore, important questions of who constitutes the public and what is 
participation and influence have to be solved in practice. 
In 1985 a Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment 36 was adopted by the Council of Ministers in the 
European Union. The EU Directive includes provisions on EIA for two classes of 
projects, one mandatory (Annex I to the Directive) and one discretionary (Annex II 
to the Directive). 
In 1993, a review of the Directive 85/337 was carried out and a report was pub-
lished 37. The review report emphasises the need for a better coverage of certain 
projects. Furthermore, consultation and public participation as well as information 
about alternatives were regarded as insufficient. Monitoring needed to be 
strengthened and there was a lack of consistency in Member States’ implementa-
tion. The review process resulted in an amended Directive 97/11/EC38. This Direc-
tive was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1997. In the new Directive there 
will be more projects subject to mandatory EIA (Annex I) and discretionary EIA 
(Annex II). Alternatives will be mandatory and there is a stronger emphasis on 
consultation and participation.  
Environmental degradation as a result of development activities is a problem with a 
multitude of dimensions. During the last decades the focus has shifted from using 
reactive ”end of pipe” solutions to applying proactive preventive approaches to 
development activities. These approaches put demands on an adequate prediction of 
potential impacts before action takes place. This is particularly true for complex 
projects where a systematic assessment is necessary.  
6.3  Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
During nearly 30 years Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has been applied 
to identify the environmental impacts of projects prior to decision making and im-
plementation. Since the introduction of EIA in the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) in the United States in 1970, EIA has been introduced in several coun-
tries and international organisations. However, experiences of EIA in projects have 
shown the advantages of assessing impacts early in the process. As a result, EIA has 
been adopted into earlier and more strategic stages of the planning process such as 
policies, plans and programmes (PPP). In this context, the concept Strategic Envi-
ronmental Assessment (SEA) is generally applied. 
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Basic SEA principles  
SEA has been established worldwide, although there is a discussion on the role and 
the aim of SEA. There exists however a certain consensus on the core of SEA. 
According to Sadler39 it should be the primary tool for integrating environment in 
decision making at a strategic level, and thereby preventing environmentally nega-
tive decisions. Others argue that SEA is one of many tools to reach environmental 
consideration in political decision-making.40 Partidario states briefly that SEA is a 
step on the road towards sustainable development.41 Sadler and Verheem42 have 
given the following definition of SEA:   
 
SEA is a systematic process for evaluating the environmental conse-
quences of proposed policy, plan or programme initiatives in order to 
ensure they are fully included and appropriately addressed at the 
earliest appropriate stage of decision making on par with economic 
and social considerations 
The concept of SEA differs from EIA of projects in content and in process, due to 
the strategic level of decision making. The acronym ”SEA” can also be problem-
atic by concealing the differences between policies, plans and programmes, which 
may lead to the assumption that SEA is a homogenous and standardised activity. 43 
Policy is in general defined as an inspiration and guidance for action, and a plan as 
a set of co-ordinated and timed objectives for the implementation of the policy, and 
a programme as a set of projects in a particular area.44 Theoretically policies, plans 
and programmes are linked to each other in a hierarchy (tiering), however in prac-
tice these links can be diffuse and overlapping. 
There is no general SEA-procedure or methodology applicable to assessments at 
policy, plan and programme level. As these levels of decision making differ in the 
processes used and in the detail and scope of the outcome of the decision (the pol-
icy, plan or programme), the SEA-approach used has to be adapted to the specific 
planning context. However, through practical experience and theory building of 
SEA a number of SEA principles have crystallised. According to Hildén et al.45 
these principles and tasks include: 
i) awareness of which policy, plans and programmes that may have significant 
environmental impacts (screening), 
ii) identification, formulation and consideration of different alternatives, 
iii) scoping to identify which impacts to assess, 
iv) transparent, open and documented decision making,  
v) mechanism for consultation and public participation 
Current SEA practices  
The application of SEA is still often undertaken on a voluntary basis as to test SEA 
methodology in a real planning context. Many countries are however incorporating 
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SEA provisions in their legislative frameworks (Finland, the Netherlands etc.), that 
in the prolongation will lead to an extended application of SEA, mainly on plans 
and programmes. Some countries have already included SEA provisions for the 
policy level. One example is Denmark where governmental bills are made subject 
to environmental assessment. 
In 1997, a proposal for an EU Directive on the environmental assessment of the 
effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (SEA Directive) was 
published.46 This can be seen as a complement to the EU Directive on EIA 47, 
which was implemented in 1985 and amended in 1997.48 In 1999, an amended 
proposal for a Council Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain plans 
and programmes on the environment was published. The proposed SEA Directive 
sets out procedural requirements, which are similar to those of the EIA Directive. 
In particular, an environmental statement describing the significant environmental 
effects of implementing the plan or programme, alternatives and mitigation meas-
ures must be prepared.  
While the strengthening of environmental considerations at strategic planning lev-
els has been the main objective of SEA, public participation is often stressed as a 
crucial part of a SEA process. In the view of SEA as a tool in a framework of 
communicative planning, one of its main aims is to provide a knowledge basis for 
decision making, which involves the participation of all interested parties.  
However, the communicative aspect of the SEA procedure is not always stressed. 
In the Swedish application of SEA within the transport and infrastructure planning 
at the national and regional level public participation was not an explicit part. 49 
SEA is in this case seen as a tool to identify the interests of different sectors and to 
show the direction of the development in relation to environmental goals if the 
policy or plan is implemented.  
6.4  Nuclear applications  
In the nuclear area, risk assessment (“safety analysis” in reactor safety and “per-
formance assessment” in the waste area) was for long time used for decision-
making almost entirely in the expert community. For higher level decision making 
the results of risk assessment were transformed by the experts. Only in the latest 
decade has demands on a more commutative risk assessment emerged, especially 
then in the nuclear waste area. Here EIA has played a significant role – in Finland 
formally for the EIA for site selection, and in Sweden as a source of inspiration for 
opening a transparent process in the site selection program.  
Lately also EIA has been formally used in Finland for a possible new nuclear 
power unit at either of the Olkiluoto or the Loviisa sites. The EIA reports were 
submitted to the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry, which was as the coordi-
nation authority.  
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The EIA reports are comprehensive descriptions of all possible environmental ef-
fects – the traditional risk assessment only being one part. In fact, the main envi-
ronmental impact of the new Finnish unit would (according to the utilities) occur 
during construction and involve discharge of cooling water into the sea after it 
becomes operational. 
In the field of decommissioning of nuclear facilities EIA will also play an impor-
tant role. In Denmark an EIA process has just been initiated concerning the de-
commissioning of the research reactors and other nuclear facilities at Risø National 
Laboratory. 
Generally accepted methods and tools for performance assessment have been de-
veloped within the expert community.  The greater integration of dialogue and 
performance assessment will inevitably require these methods to be revisited. For 
the future it can be expected that risk assessment for decision-making, using EIA 
and SEA processes, will be much more interactive and communicative than has 
earlier been the case.   
This would include conducting risk assessment by starting from the issues of con-
cern among stakeholders and communicating with them during the risk assessment 
work. Almost certainly this would mean a broad evaluation framework considering 
possible alternative regulations and indicators of risk. The dialogue should build 
confidence among stakeholders so that they can express their concerns, feel that 
their concerns/values are legitimate and see that their values are being incorpo-
rated.  
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7.  Safety culture 
Safety culture was introduced as a concept after the Chernobyl accident when an 
international review group identified lacking concern and poor attitudes in regard 
of safety as the root cause for the accident.50 The concept attracted immediate in-
terest and several activities were initiated to concretise it and make it operational51. 
Already in 1991 the Council of State in Finland decided to amend a requirement 
for “advanced safety culture” in the safety regulations for the nuclear power 
plants52. In Sweden a joint working group between the nuclear safety authority and 
the utilities wrote a pamphlet explaining and promoting the concept of safety cul-
ture53. 
In the SOS-1 project, safety culture has been addressed in a seminar and in a field 
study based on interviews at the Finnish and Swedish nuclear power plants. 
The Olkiluoto seminar on safety culture  
The seminar, held at the Olkiluoto NPP in Finland in October 1999, gave a broad 
view of the developments and current approaches to foster safety culture, both at 
the nuclear utilities and at the safety authorities54. Presentations were given from a 
regulatory and a utility perspective. Preliminary results from the field study were 
presented and discussed. Two presentations from the outside of the nuclear area 
were also given, one discussing organisational culture in a larger context and risk 
management in the society in general from other regulatory perspectives. One pres-
entation from IAEA described ongoing activities connected to safety culture. In 
addition group discussions on different aspects of safety culture were held and 
reported in plenum. 
One of the generic themes discussed at the seminar was to what extent it is possible 
or even appropriate to try to measure the safety culture. According to one view it is 
important to measure to be able to control and therefore good indicators of safety 
culture should be applied. The other view is that culture is something, which can-
not be controlled, because it is anchored deeply in common values and underlying 
assumptions of people. Even if the seminar did not give any definite answer to this 
very fundamental question, the report concludes that the interpretation of the con-
cept as the ability of an organisation to create safety by knowledge and involve-
ment may be constructive in giving ideas of prerequisites for safety. We should 
have the ambition to continuously test new ways and learn from experience in or-
der to further develop the understanding of what is good and bad safety culture. 
Views on safety culture at the nuclear utilities 
A series of interviews were carried out at all nuclear power plants in Finland and 
Sweden.55 In the study a total of 39 persons were interviewed on their views on 
safety culture, its assessment and possible threats to the safety culture. In general 
there were no large differences in views, but the way people answered the ques-
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tions may have reflected the way in which the concept had been introduced to them 
and their organisation.  
In the discussion of the concept itself many referred to openness in communication 
to make it possible also to address difficult issues. Many also made reference to 
attitudes and commitment and pointed out that a good safety culture builds on 
competence. The question on indicators of safety culture brought many observa-
tions on what can be considered as a good respective bad safety culture. On a ques-
tion on how to foster a good safety culture many pointed to the example shown by 
the management and the need for discussing and explaining. Many saw the deregu-
lation as a potential threat for the safety culture and others mentioned the difficulty 
of attracting young professionals. 
The study gave a good overview of present activities at the nuclear power plants, 
which have an application to safety culture. The report also gave a reason for an in-
depth discussion of aspects of the concept safety culture. 
Organisational culture within a regulatory body 
A case study was carried out to investigate the organisational culture at the nuclear 
regulation department of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in 
Finland.56 The goal for the study was to survey views on the present and an ideal 
organisational culture within STUK. The study was built on a series of develop-
ment seminars in which the participants were engaged in several group exercises. 
The study shows, as also was expected, that the organisational culture of STUK is 
strongly oriented towards norms. This was not viewed completely ideal because 
people also felt the need for goal orientation, support and innovation. The regula-
tory activities can be seen as having an indirect effect on the safety of the nuclear 
power plants, which means that it is difficult to get feedback on how they are car-
ried out. A typical characteristic is also an emphasis on individual expertise, which 
is connected to the large span of competence required to approach all safety related 
issues at a nuclear power plant. 
The study shows a very large commitment to safety and actions at the nuclear 
power plants for improving safety. A commitment to own work and a sense of 
responsibility are the main reasons for people to stay within the organisation. Peo-
ple have a shared view that the work they do as agents for the society, has an im-
portant function in ensuring safety of the nuclear power plants. The study provided 
many important insights and ideas for a further development of regulatory activi-
ties. 
Some observations 
Discussing the concept of safety culture with people one could note a slight differ-
ence in the views, which appears to depend on the educational background of the 
person. Engineers and others with a background in natural sciences tend to view 
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the concept in more straightforward ways and they often advocate the view that 
safety culture should be measured in one way or another. People with a background 
in behavioural sciences instead tend to view the concept in a more complex way, 
which makes it very difficult to measure and control. Relying on literature in be-
havioural sciences this more complex interpretation of the concept of culture seems 
to be more correct at least if it is understood to account for all underlying mecha-
nism's which are influencing the behaviour of people. 
Safety culture in this broader context is not something, which can be controlled by 
the management, but it can certainly be influenced. The way safety culture can be 
influenced is not through speeches and instructions, but it is through the whole 
atmosphere as created jointly by the management and the personnel. People are 
very sensitive to dishonesty, which managers have to understand in making their 
messages and acting believable. The creation of a good safety culture also builds 
on a willingness to take responsibility and to act, which means that whatever the 
management is not satisfied with should be enacted on strongly.  
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8.  Safety indicators 
Indicators are often used as instruments in managing organisations when it is diffi-
cult to get objective performance measurements. Performance indicators are spe-
cific performance measures (positive or negative, like the production capacity on a 
yearly basis and collective radiation dose, respectively), which may be assumed to 
reflect the general performance characteristics of a plant. Safety indicators (e.g. 
numbers of scrams) are similarly assumed to reflect the safety of the plant in gen-
eral. Nuclear power plants have searched for suitable indicators for assessing safety 
and the present part of the report is intended to give an account of some issues con-
nected to the use of safety indicators. The following text is a reflection of material 
presented and discussed at a NKS/SOS-1 seminar which was held at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT) in Espoo, Finland at 17–18 March 1999.57  
The definition and use of safety indicators 
Supervision of operational safety is generally concerned with the safety provisions 
as well as the resulting safety, reflected in observed accident rates as compared to 
applied safety criteria. However, in the case of nuclear power plants, accidents may 
be conceived that have to be altogether excluded. The supervision will in this case 
be confined, in practice, to ensuring that the safety provisions, administrative as 
well as technical, are all in place, under control and adequate as to be confirmed by 
safety analyses.  
There are clearly many aspects to be accounted for in supervising safety. Safety 
indicators basically represent aspects paid particular attention. All that can be ob-
served, relating to the efficiency of the safety provisions, e.g., through auditing, 
regular inspection, testing, drills and follow-up of operating experience, may in fact 
be considered safety indicators. The observations may concern preparedness, con-
ditions and performance of the safety provisions, partly as inferred from observed 
failures and incidents. Examples of primary safety indicators thus include, e.g., rate 
of unscheduled scrams, collective radiation exposure, numbers of defective fuel 
assemblies etc. 
Primary safety indicators may be compounded to provide, in combination, meas-
ures of integrated features, e.g. safety system availability (in regard of the utiliza-
tion of allowed repair times), coolant chemistry performance etc. Compounded 
indicators, usually referred to as “soft” or “safety culture indicators”, are also used 
in attempting to reflect the ability and the dedication of the organization and its 
individuals in maintaining and developing the safety provisions. Examples include 
rate of incidents relating to human behaviour, rate of repetitive failures, relative 
numbers of corrective measures required on the basis of auditing, which are com-
pleted according to plans etc. Safety culture indicators are, in addition, identified 
and observed through surveys and interviews.  
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Safety indicators are usually chosen to be countable (e.g. numbers of scrams, num-
ber of repeated errors) or measurable (e.g. tightness, chemistry index) so that sim-
ple criteria may be applied in judging them and trends may be observed. However, 
safety indicators should be seen in qualitative observations as well, e.g. as obtained 
in audits and interviews. Observations that, e.g., safety deficiencies are increas-
ingly being revealed by chance rather than in regular quality control, or gaps are 
being revealed in the basic understanding of important safety aspects, thus provide 
important indications of needs to improve the management of safety. 
Safety indicators are closely connected to safety management activities in general. 
The definition and use of safety indicators should, therefore, be connected to the 
definition and follow up of organisational goals. In principle it is possible to weigh 
together safety indicators from lower levels of the organisation to form more gen-
eral indicators on a higher level. This is actually carried out in application of the 
balanced score card approach58 that has been taken into use by some of the nuclear 
power plants. 
International activities on safety indicators 
IAEA has for a number of years worked with the task of finding a feasible set of 
safety indicators. A recent report describes an effort of four plants to define and 
gain experience from pilot implementations of safety indicators.59 OECD/NEA has 
also issued a report on safety indicators.60 
Most nuclear power plants have adopted the so-called WANO indicators (cf.Table 
2), which are followed on a regular basis. The WANO-indicators give a good basis 
for participating plants to establish a basis for their own performance as compared 
with a world average. They are however not that useful in the day to day safety 
management activities. 
USNRC has used an indicator system called SALP (Systematic Assessment of 
Licensee Performance) for their periodic reviews. That system was discontinued in 
1998 and has now been replaced with semi-annual performance reviews. This sys-
tem evaluates a number of performance indicators grouped under seven safety cor-
nerstones: initiating events, mitigating systems, integrity of barriers to release of 
radioactivity, emergency preparedness, occupational radiation safety, public radia-
tion safety and physical protection.61   
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 1 Unit capability factor 
2 Unplanned capability loss factor 
3 Unplanned automatic scrams per 7000 hours critical 
4 Safety system performance (HPSI, AFW, AC) 
5 Thermal performance 
6 Fuel reliability 
Table 2: The WANO indicators 
 
Some observations 
NKS has sponsored earlier contributions to work on safety indicators. During the 
period 1991-94 the project SIK-1 contained one activity on safety indicators.62 
There was also a more detailed study63 pondering how safety indicators can be 
used and which candidates would be relevant. The point of departure for that work 
was technical although some indicators were proposed to be connected also to the 
personnel and the organisational systems.  
At the seminar the use of indicators at other industrial areas were also discussed. 
These presentations gave focus especially on indicators connected to attitudes and 
beliefs as contributors to safety. The indicator systems were built on the use of 
questionnaires, which have been analysed with a factor analysis to identify impor-
tant dimensions of influence.  
There are many benefits with the use of indicators, but there are also some dangers. 
One specific danger is that the indicators are lifted up and treated as organisational 
goals. When indicators are used they should remain as indicators, which also im-
plies that they should be changed regularly to better reflect the goals of the organi-
sation.  
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9.  Quality systems 
Quality systems are used at the nuclear power plants to ensure that all activities are 
carried out with an acceptable quality.64 The quality systems can on a generic level 
be seen to contain a documentation of an agreed quality together with a description 
of how that quality is reached. The quality systems used at the nuclear power plants 
today are rather comprehensive covering most activities, which have a relationship 
to safety. In the SOS-1 project an activity to survey views on quality and experi-
ences with the quality systems used at the nuclear power plants in Finland and 
Sweden and at the research reactor in Halden, Norway, was carried out. An impor-
tant part of the activity was a seminar, which was arranged in Ringhals 16-
17.1.2001.65 
Views on quality and quality systems 
In the study a total of 74 people at the NPPs in Barsebäck, Forsmark, Loviisa, 
Olkiluoto, Oskarshamn and Ringhals, and at the research reactor in Halden were 
interviewed concerning their views on quality and quality systems. The aim with 
the study was to get information on the suitability and efficiency of the quality 
systems, which presently are in use. Ten areas (cf. Table 3) closely connected to 
quality and quality systems were covered in the interviews. The interviews were 
taped and transcribed for further analysis. The first impressions of the study were 
reported at the seminar and more extensively in a separate report.66 
As it was to be expected there was a complete agreement that quality is essential in 
ensuring safety at the nuclear installations. Quality was generally well understood 
in line with currently established definitions. Good quality systems are associated 
with structure and understandability. All regarded the quality audits as important, 
in promoting the concept of quality as well as in identifying the needs for im-
provements in various activities. The system of procedures, instructions and hand-
books, was seen as one of the most important means to reach defined quality ends. 
Many of the interviewed were concerned that their systems of procedures, instruc-
tions and handbooks had been allowed to grow too large. Some of the NPPs have 
on voluntary basis selected to comply with ISO14000 to minimise environmental 
impacts and to have this activity certified.  
Process orientation in the work activities has been introduced in many organisa-
tions as a means to put a larger emphasis on a smooth progress of work. In foster-
ing quality thinking, many emphasised the need for applying a motivating approach 
instead of only considering the formal aspects of the quality system. Many agreed 
on that in a longer term there will be considerable difficulties in maintaining com-
petence in specialised nuclear fields. The largest future challenge is to maintain 
public trust and confidence in the safety of the plants at the same time, as they are 
economically competitive. Many of the interviewed in Sweden referred to the un-
certainty for the future in regard of the political decision to close down the nuclear 
 37
plants in a foreseeable future, in many instances well before the end of their eco-
nomic life expectancy. 
 
 
1. The quality concept  
2. Quality systems 
3. Topical quality related issues 
4. Means to reach quality ends 
5. Rules and procedures  
6. Competency and training 
Table 3:  Areas discussed in the interviews. 
 
Organising for quality 
Quality systems can in a broader context be seen as providing a management tool 
for ensuring that all NPP activities are carried out safely and economically. There 
are regulatory requirements on quality systems that they should be documented, 
reviewed and updated. The quality systems are typically described as starting from 
top with a quality policy, which is broken down in managerial directives and re-
quirements applying at different organisational levels. The directives and require-
ments link further to detailed instructions and working procedures. Today the qual-
ity systems are actually expanded and merged with other systems to become inte-
grated management systems providing a documented account of all activities with 
a start from a broad mission statement and ending in the detailed instructions for 
tasks to be carried out. 
The challenge in developing quality systems seems to be in finding a suitable struc-
ture, which makes it easy to navigate between principles, requirements and solu-
tions. Another challenge is to break down general goals and requirements to give 
guidance for the practical safety activities. There is a natural strive to build good 
quality systems, but already the notion that a quality system is good contains a 
hidden danger of complacency. It seems clear that the quality systems have an im-
portant task of ensuring a systematic knowledge sharing and learning. 
It is evident that modern information technology offers several opportunities to 
build systems, which contribute to better quality. The accessibility of the quality 
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system can be improved using computerised information systems with hyperlinks 
between different parts of the system. The transfer of procedures and documenta-
tion to a suitable computerised platform, has a large efficiency potential as com-
pared with traditional paper based systems. 
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10.  Challenges for the future 
The SOS-1 project has highlighted current developments within the nuclear energy 
area on a broad basis. It has taken the view that safety essentially should be under-
stood as awareness among all concerned in regard of the control of risk. This 
means that safety can not be said to be fully provided for until it has been docu-
mented, communicated and understood. There is thus a close connection between 
risk communication both within (and between) the experts groups, and between 
them and concerned citizens. In this chapter we discuss some challenges for the 
future, first with regard to risk communication and then to organizing for safety. 
10.1  Organizing for risk communication 
Expert domination 
The nuclear industry evolved from newly discovered principles in physics that had 
been used in the nuclear weapons development. The new industry was thus charac-
terized by advanced science, large scale projects and a great deal of secrecy. It is 
obvious that this was not the best environment for communication with the public. 
Indeed, communication was not really seen to be needed in the expert dominated 
society where the decisions were taken by the so called DAD (Decide, Announce 
and Defend) principle.   
With time, however, nuclear power met increasing public opposition, which, to-
gether with weakening economy, very complex licensing procedures in the US and 
the accidents in TMI and Chernobyl, led to almost a total stop for new reactors 
world-wide. Now one can perhaps see a turning point, with the proposed new reac-
tor in Finland motivated by e.g. future electricity demands and as a means to fulfil 
the Kyoto convention. It seems, however, evident that the industry must take a 
more communicative mode of action than was done in the early phase, so that the 
DAD principle is abandoned and decisions are made transparent to gain public 
participation on the basis of awareness. 
Progress in nuclear waste  
Also in the nuclear waste area, experts have dominated the decision process. In 
Sweden this has occasionally been criticized. In a supporting document to the R&D 
Programme of 199567, it was said by SKB that  "scenario selection, or the selection 
of premises for different scenarios, is done by experts." KASAM68 criticized this; 
“The selection of scenarios is not a science but a question of deciding which hypo-
thetical future events need to be included in the safety assessment. This is a deci-
sion which cannot be considered to be reserved exclusively for ‘experts’.”  
The choice of overall approach to the long-term management of high level nuclear 
waste must rely on a number of value based considerations. The very question 
whether to act in our lifetime for a final solution, typically including a deep reposi-
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tory, or to wait for a possible technical and economical breakthrough for new tech-
nologies, such us transmutation, is maybe the most obvious value-laden issue. An-
other example is retrievability which leads to a repository that may be left open for 
an undefined period of time – then one values flexibility over final solutions to the 
extent that the consequences for future generations can not be foreseen. Also, the 
selection of a site for a repository involves more value-laden aspects than is nor-
mally acknowledged.  
Still, it might be fair to say the nuclear waste area is a forerunner in developing 
methods and frameworks for transparency and public participation, which have 
also been applied e.g. in the site selection process. The Environment Impact As-
sessment has been an “umbrella process” for this both in Sweden and Finland, 
within which many new and innovative initiatives have taken place.  It is believed 
that some of the methods developed could set example not just within the nuclear 
sector, but also for other complex areas such as biotechnology69.  
Some elements for improved risk communication  
From this it is possible to suggest some elements in a strategy for risk communica-
tion:  
• The overall attitude (among decision-makers, industry regulators etc) must 
become more communicative, with the point of departure that decisions on 
nuclear power, siting of repositories etc are grounded in public values 
• The nuclear waste issues (as well as the investigations for a fifth reactor in 
Finland) have shown that communication can be grounded in an all-
covering process (“umbrella process”) such as EIA or Strategic Environ-
mental Assessment (SEA) 
• Within the umbrella process there is room for testing many tools such as 
different forms of hearings, consensus conferences etc  
• There is room for the regulatory bodies to play an active role in this com-
munication 
• One should not underestimate “the public”, which also possesses various 
areas of expertise. The experiences in Oskarshamn show that laypeople 
(non-professionals in nuclear safety such as politicians, civil servants, stu-
dents etc) can develop capacity for “stretching” and challenging the indus-
try implementer.  
• The concept of “stretching” has become very useful for understanding how 
transparency can be achieved. Enhancing the stretching capacity of lay 
people also in the nuclear reactor area would be good also for the utilities. 
In Sweden, this may be possible with the local safety councils.  
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The safety analysis  
The safety analysis is at the core of risk assessment for decision-making both in 
reactor safety and for waste disposal. A strategy for risk communication should 
thus include the safety analysis as one element. Generally accepted methods and 
tools for the safety analysis have been developed within the expert community of 
both areas. Greater integration of dialogue and safety analysis will inevitably re-
quire these methods to be revisited.  At many levels, it is difficult to see how to 
reconcile the two - for example public concerns about worst case situations vs a 
probabilistic approach to modelling the future, and concerns about spectacular or 
tangible future events vs structured analysis of features, events and processes to 
derive base and variant scenarios to be analysed. How to do this is certainly a chal-
lenge for the future, which for the nuclear waste part is addressed within the EU 
RISCOM-II project.  
A word of caution 
Finally a word of caution may be appropriate.  There is a danger that some with 
“communication” and  “improving the decision making process” could mean that 
their values (“the right values”) necessarily would come forward as more decisive 
than others. Using sophisticated methods for risk communication in such strategic 
purposes would be close to manipulation. Transparency should mean that both the 
factual issues and the value laden aspects should be as clear as possible for the 
decision-makers and the public. All in all, this would increase the awareness in 
societal decision-making. This will not necessarily lead to decision-making in con-
sensus – there will often be remaining opposing attitudes. But after all, this is why 
we have a democratic system with politicians who should represent our values.  
10.2  Organizing for safety  
Experience from high reliability organisations has brought many insights in how to 
organise for safety, but has also demonstrated mechanisms, which may introduce 
hidden deficiencies in the safety activities. The challenge is to detect and correct 
such deficiencies before an incident makes them obvious. The issues discussed 
below are some of the insights, which have been facilitated by the discussion 
within the SOS-1 project. 
The principle of continuous improvements 
In the interviews carried out within the SOS-1 project many people made a refer-
ence to the principle of continuous improvements, i.e. to ensure at all times con-
tinuing efforts aimed at achieving further improvement of safety. This principle is 
not new as it was introduced many years ago as a part of the Japanese quality ap-
proach, called Kaizen. This principle has also been written into IAEA documents 
as one of the guiding principles in reaching safety70. To an outsider it may seem 
strange that this kind of continuous improvement is necessary or even possible. 
The view that something is good enough however carries the implicit understand-
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ing that nothing more has to be done, which often is a first step to complacency and 
further neglections on a slippery road towards an accident. 
The principle of continuous improvement also contains the recognition that work 
activities need a continuous reassessment of the people involved to define for 
themselves where the margins to safety are. This has also the benefit of making the 
safety culture overt and accessible for new persons entering the group.  
A balanced approach to safety 
There are many challenges to which managers at the nuclear power plants have to 
respond. Safety and economy are sometimes seen as conflicting, but on a long term 
compromised safety is always bad economy. On the other hand a proactive ap-
proach to safety requires a good economy. The allocation of resources on various 
activities have an important influence on safety and the management therefore has 
to select for instance between technical improvements in the plant as compared 
with investments in personnel skills. 
Balanced approach to safety implies that no reallocation of resources for the pur-
pose of safety would lead to increased safety. Increasing the resources will thus 
have about the same marginal influence on truly balanced safety whatever alterna-
tive means are considered. In practice, this insight is important for ensuring that 
available resources are made the most of in providing for safety.   
There are also a number of other balances to be considered for an optimal result. 
Safety of nuclear power builds on traditions, but it is still necessary to be open for 
renewal. In all phases of plant design, construction and operation it is necessary to 
combine a consideration of the entirety with the details. At all levels supervision 
has to be combined with confidence in people and their willingness to do their best. 
The safety has to build on systems, but the systems cannot function without de-
voted and competent individuals.  
Issues connected to management and organisation 
The SOS-1 project investigated safety indicators, safety culture and quality sys-
tems. They are all connected to the management systems, which are concerned 
with formulation of goals and follow up of how they are achieved. These issues 
were also touched on in an earlier NKS report.71 
Managing nuclear power plants is on one hand a matter of managing people in a 
dynamic business environment and on the other hand of strictly meeting the re-
quirements for safety. This requires a great deal of assurance that the managers 
well understand their roles and tasks. What are the important things, where can you 
make compromises and where is it necessary to proceed unyieldingly?  
Managing is also concerned with communicating with people. Managers have to be 
able to motivate, but also to sense signals of people and the whole organisation of 
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emerging difficulties. There will always be differences in views on various matters 
and then the managers should be able to see the real issue of the dispute and make 
a choice. Many of the managers at the plants in Finland and Sweden have a solid 
background in technical sciences, which certainly is a good thing, but it may also 
imply that they should be given training also in more general managerial skills. 
Maintaining competence 
A challenge for the whole nuclear community is to maintain an adequate compe-
tence over the remaining lifetime of the nuclear power plants.72 Present prospects 
call for a total life-time of reactors of even 60 years, which means that even those 
hired today most likely will retire before the plants finally are shut down. Many of 
the persons interviewed in the SOS-1 project voiced concerns in this respect. 
There have been discussions within the nuclear community for how to address this 
issue. A recent OECD/NEA report describes the issue of education and training in 
more detail.73 In Finland the Ministry of Trade and Industry set up a working group 
to analyse the contents and scope of know-how required for a continuing the safe 
operation of the existing plants.74 Research has been and will still continue to be an 
important component in building up the present level of competence at the nuclear 
power plants.75  In Sweden both the industry and the government have taken initia-
tives to clarify future needs for nuclear safety competence.  
International co-operation is an important component in maintaining competence 
within the nuclear community. The international organisations such as IAEA and 
OECD/NEA have had an important role in helping people to build contact nets all 
over the world. The research programmes of the European Union have also been 
very important in providing possibilities to do something more. Also the next pro-
gramme of NKS has an important function to fill as a contact forum between re-
searchers in the Nordic countries. 
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11.  Conclusions 
The project has attempted to describe and analyse approaches for achieving nuclear 
safety across a broad range of perspectives. This has been done with a variety of 
methods, such as questionnaires, interviews, seminars, special research projects 
and focus group discussions. Mostly people actively working with nuclear safety 
(in industry, regulatory bodies, universities and consultant companies) were in-
volved. Parts of the project have also approached lay people with some connection 
to nuclear safety. In one report we describe approaches to risk management in other 
sectors.  
Experience from high reliability organisations has brought many insights into how 
to organise for safety, also with respect to mechanisms, which may introduce hid-
den deficiencies in the safety activities. The challenge is to detect and correct such 
deficiencies before an incident makes them obvious. 
The concept of safety culture, that emerged after the Chernobyl accident, has a 
considerable impact on the nuclear safety work, even though it may be hard, or 
probably impossible, to define it so that it can be measured. The interpretation of 
the concept as the ability of an organisation to create safety by knowledge and in-
volvement seems constructive and inspiring. A special aspect of the concept ap-
plies to the regulatory authorities, concerned with regulating and overseeing the 
safety management on part of the utilities, and indeed reviewing their safety cul-
ture. The term organisational culture may accordingly be preferred in this case. 
However, competence and commitment are clearly key prerequisites also for the 
authorities. 
The safety culture must continuously be encouraged and stimulated by manage-
ment, especially since it can be exposed to negative pressure from both inside and 
outside factors. Many see the deregulation as a potential threat to the safety culture 
and others have specifically mentioned the difficulty of attracting young profes-
sionals to the nuclear area. 
Even if safety culture can not be estimated with precision, it is connected to the 
concept of safety indicators. Due to the high level of safety required in operating 
nuclear plants, excluding reference to prior accidents for assessment, the safety 
indicators play an important role in safety management by providing measures of 
the current condition of safety. The indicators should be able to provide warnings 
that future performance might be in danger. Furthermore, safety indicators should 
reflect a development over time to make a judgement whether the present devel-
opment is for the better or for the worse. 
There are many benefits with the use of indicators, but there are also some dangers. 
One specific danger is that the indicators are lifted up and treated as organisational 
goals. When indicators are used they should remain as indicators, which also im-
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plies that they should be reassessed continuously to better reflect the goals of the 
organisation.  
The concept of quality systems has also been subject to special interest in SOS-1. 
Quality systems are presently to a great deal on the agenda of the Nordic nuclear 
power plants and have throughout been subject to intense review and development 
from time to time. On a generic level it can be seen to contain documentation of an 
agreed quality together with a description of how that quality is reached. It seems 
clear that the quality systems have an important task of ensuring a systematic 
knowledge sharing and learning. 
The main challenge in developing the quality systems concerns finding structures 
presenting lucidly and consistently the break-down of the goals and principal re-
quirements all the way to the detailed, procedural requirements. Modern informa-
tion technology is seen to be important in facilitating overview and access to the 
information contained in the quality systems but is in general not fully exploited so 
far. Process orientation, having important bearing on quality, is in the process of 
being introduced and evaluated in many of the NPPs. The concept is about paying 
particular attention to the performance of those processes in the organisation that 
flow across the line organisation in order to ensure proper coordination. 
In chapter 4 we made an overview of safety management in both rector safety and 
nuclear waste disposal. Even if the two areas in some respects are very different, 
the basic safety approaches to safety management and regulatory oversight are 
similar. We also summarized the results from a special report on risk management 
in other industrial areas in Europe. Also here we see similarities with the nuclear 
sector. For example, there seems to be a broad consensus about levels of acceptable 
and unacceptable risk and some of the procedural requirements are similar. Deter-
ministic and probabilistic methods are used in the risk assessment, although they 
are given different importance in different countries. However, in the nuclear area, 
the advanced safety work is perhaps more mature with e.g. more established proce-
dures for internal reviews and a strong regulatory framework on the national scale.  
Communicating risk and safety was for long a neglected area in the nuclear sector. 
Although the basic principles for good risk communication are now well known, it 
is still a long way to go before they are fully acknowledged and used by the nuclear 
society at large. Here the nuclear waste area has been a forerunner with both for-
malised and informal methods. The Environmental Impact Assessment principles 
have proven to be a suitable overall framework. Well informed groups of laypeople 
can play a key role in providing for transparency by stretching the experts. This has 
taken place in the nuclear waste area but to a very limited extent in the field of 
reactor safety. One part of the SOS-1 work has indicated that groups like the local 
safety councils that exist in Sweden could play an active role in this respect.  
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Another part of SOS-1, conduced in cooperation with the European RISCOM-II 
project, has been devoted to the safety analysis of final repositories for nuclear 
waste. More specifically the aim was to investigate assumptions of value-laden 
nature that experts make in their analyses; the importance this is given by the ex-
perts themselves; and if such value-laden assumptions are made in a transparent 
way. The results provide a basis for more in-depth understanding about how risk 
communication can be enhanced in the nuclear waste area. In many cases, it is 
difficult to see how to reconcile expert methods and public concerns, indeed, it 
may be necessary to consider alternative tools within the safety analysis framework 
to achieve effective dialogue. This would include conducting the safety analysis by 
starting from the issues of concern among stakeholders and communicating with 
them during the assessment. This may mean a broader evaluation framework con-
sidering possible alternative regulations and indicators of risk. The dialogue should 
build confidence among stakeholders so that they can express their concerns, feel 
that their concerns/values are legitimate and see that their values are being incorpo-
rated.  
A challenge for the whole nuclear community is to maintain an adequate compe-
tence over the remaining lifetime of the nuclear power plants, and beyond. Many 
of the persons interviewed in the SOS-1 project voiced concerns in this respect. In 
Sweden and Finland both the industry and the government have taken initiatives to 
clarify future needs for nuclear safety competence.  
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Appendix 1:  Acronyms 
BNFL British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
DAD Decide, Announce and Defend 
HAZOP  HAZard and OPerability analysis 
MTO  Man – Technology – Organisation 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant  
PA Performance Assessment  
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessments 
QRA  Quantified Risk Assessment 
SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance 
SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment 
TMI Three Mile Island 
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators 
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Appendix 2:  Reports produced within the project 
Säkerhetsindikatorer inom kärnkraftindustrin; definitioner, användning och erfa-
renheter. Rapport från ett seminarium på VTT den 17-18 mars 1999; Björn 
Wahlström (red.), Rapport NKS-3, 1999. 
 
Organisational culture at the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland, 
FINNUS/WOPS/TUKU-99 
 
NKS/SOS-1 Seminarium om säkerhetskultur, Rapport från ett seminarium i Olki-
luoto den 26-27 oktober 1999; Björn Wahlström, Lennart Hammar, Rapport NKS-
10, 2000 
 
Syn på säkerhetskultur vid svenska och finska kärnkraftverk; Lennart Hammar, 
Björn Wahlström, Jari Kettunen, Rapport NKS-14, 2000 
Safety and risk analysis activities in other areas than the nuclear industry; Igor 
Kozine, Nijs Duijm, Kurt Lauridsen. Rapport NSK-21, 2000 
L. Hammar & K. Andersson, Communicating on risk and safety in terms of aware-
ness VALDOR Symposium Stockholm, June 1999 
 
L. Hammar & K. Andersson, Awareness – A key to safety management and risk 
communication,  ESREL-2000; SRA Annual Conference, Edinburgh den 14-17 
May 2000 
 
NKS/SOS-1 Seminar on safety analysis -Report from a seminar held on 22-23 
March 2000, Risø National Laboratory, Roskilde; Kurt Lauridsen, Kjell Anders-
son, Urho Pulkkinen. NKS-34, 2001 
 
NKS/SOS-1 Seminarium om riskkommunikation i Oskarshamn; Kjell Andersson, 
Rapport NKS-33, 2001 
 
NKS/SOS-1 Seminarium om kvalitetessäkring, Rapport från ett seminarium i 
Ringhals den 16-17 januari 2001; Lennart Hammar, Björn Wahlström, Rapport 
NKS-30, 2000 
 
Syn på kvalitetssäkring vid svenska och finska kärnkraftverk; Lennart Hammar, 
Bengt Lidh, Björn Wahlström, Teemu Reiman. Rapport NKS-38, 2001 
Gränsöverskridande kommunikation, Problem och lärdomar i kommunikationen 
över expertområden; Britt-Marie Drottz Sjöberg, Rapport NKS-37, 2001 
From Risk Analysis to the Safety Case. Values in Risk Assessments. Britt-Marie 
Drottz Sjöberg, Draft, January 2002 
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Seminarium om miljökonsekvensbeskrivning (MKB) och strategisk miljöbedöm-
ning (SMB) i Åbo den 22-24 augusti 2001, Karin Brodén och Kjell Andersson. In 
print   
I. Kozine, N.J. Duijm and K. Lauridsen, Safety- and Risk Analysis Activities in 
Chemical Industry in Europe. VALDOR 200,1 Stockholm June 2001. 
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Appendix 3:  Financing 
Financing of the studies within SOS-1 including the preproject. 
Country Participation organi-
sations 
NKS-
financing 
National financing 
  kDKK Financier kDKK  
Denmark Risø Risø 400 
Finland VTT, Posiva, TVO, 
Fortum, STUK, HIM 
VTT, Posiva, 
TVO, Fortum, 
STUK, HIM 
820 
Iceland -  0 
Norway IFE, NTNU IFE 140 
Sweden Karinta, ES-Konsult 
BMD Reserach, SKI,  
SSI, SKB, Kraftbola-
gen 
SSI, SKI, SKB, 
Kraftbolagen 
2750 
Total  3657  4110 
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